Economic Sanctions: Embargo on Stage. Theory and Empirical Evidence by GOLLIARD, MÉLANIE
  
 
Département d’Economie Politique 
Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales 
 
Chaire d’Economie Internationale et d’Economie 
Régionale 
Thierry Madiès, Professeur ordinaire 
 
Department of Economics and Accounting 
Hannu Laurila, Professor 
 
Economic Sanctions: Embargo on Stage. Theory 
and Empirical Evidence. 
Under the supervision of: 
 Professor Thierry Madiès  
Chaire d’Economie Internationale et d’Economie Régionale 
And 
Professor Hannu Laurila 
Department of Economics and Accounting 
Mélanie Marilyne Golliard 
Fribourg, January 2013.  
   
  
  
2 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 5 
List of Tables........................................................................................................... 6 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................... 7 
List of Boxes ........................................................................................................... 8 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 9 
1 Historical and Institutional Framework ........................................................ 11 
1.1 History .................................................................................................... 11 
1.2 Institutional Law Framework ................................................................. 13 
1.2.1 Public International Law ................................................................. 13 
1.2.2 From War to the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force............ 14 
1.2.3 Role of International Organizations ................................................ 16 
1.2.4 The League of Nations and the United Nations .............................. 18 
1.3 Essential Notions about Sanctions ......................................................... 22 
2 The Theory of International Economics: an Application to Economic 
Sanctions ............................................................................................................... 30 
2.1 Effects on an Embargo on Trade: an International Economics 
Perspective ........................................................................................................ 30 
2.1.1 A Surplus Analysis .......................................................................... 31 
2.1.1.1 Effects on an Export Embargo ................................................. 34 
2.1.1.2 Effects on an Import Embargo ................................................. 36 
2.1.1.3 Conclusions .............................................................................. 38 
2.1.2 An Offer Curves Analysis ............................................................... 39 
2.1.2.1 Situation of Multilateral Sanctions .......................................... 41 
2.1.2.2 Situation of Unilateral Sanctions ............................................. 42 
2.1.2.3 Conclusions .............................................................................. 43 
  
3 
2.2 The Domestic Decision of Implementation of an Embargo: the Game of 
Interest Groups .................................................................................................. 44 
2.2.1 The Game of Interest Groups in the Sender Country ...................... 46 
2.2.2 The Game of Interest Groups in the Target Country ...................... 50 
2.2.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................... 53 
2.3 Sanctioning Process and Formation of a Coalition of Sender Countries 53 
2.3.1 The Sender-Target Relationship: Why the Coalition of Countries 
Implement Sanctions? ................................................................................... 54 
2.3.2 The Formation of a Coalition between Sender Countries: What tell 
us Game Theory? .......................................................................................... 58 
2.3.3 Explaining the Sanction Busting Trade Phenomenon ..................... 61 
3 Empirical Evidence ....................................................................................... 66 
3.1 What do Econometric Models predict? .................................................. 66 
3.1.1 US Economic Sanctions’ Impact on US Trade with Target Countries 
and Third Countries....................................................................................... 67 
3.1.1.1 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on US Bilateral Trade ...... 70 
3.1.1.2 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on US Exports.................. 73 
3.1.1.3 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on US Imports.................. 76 
3.1.1.4 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on European Union and 
Japan 78 
3.1.1.5 Conclusions .............................................................................. 82 
3.1.2 Effects of UN Sanctions on Target and Neighbor Countries .......... 83 
3.1.2.1 Claims and hypotheses............................................................. 83 
3.1.2.2 Method and variables ............................................................... 84 
3.1.2.3 Results ...................................................................................... 87 
3.1.2.4 Conclusions .............................................................................. 93 
3.2 What do Case Studies tell us? The Cases of Cuba and Iran ................... 93 
  
4 
3.2.1 Case Study on Cuba: the Reference as regards Economic Sanctions
 93 
3.2.2 Case study on Iran ......................................................................... 102 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 107 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 110 
Websites .............................................................................................................. 115 
Appendix ............................................................................................................. 116 
 
 
  
5 
Abstract 
Economic sanctions appear to be a common and recurring tool of international 
relations. Indeed, sender country or more generally, the international community, 
resorts to economic sanctions in order to punish and attempt to change a target 
country’s objectionable policy behavior. However, economic sanctions imply 
costs, especially in terms of trade. This thesis provides an overview of the 
literature on this topic, in describing the historical and institutional law framework 
of economic sanctions and in presenting models and empirical works. The first 
part describes the history, the institutional law framework related to economic 
sanctions and essential notions. The second part presents fundamental models and 
insights to explain the phenomenon of economic sanctions. Trade’s theoretical 
impacts will be reviewed before discussing the implementation of sanctions, in 
both domestic and single-rational actor methodologies. The final section will 
introduce empirical studies on the impact of economic sanctions on trade.  
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Introduction 
The United States, followed by the European Union, adopted economic sanctions 
against Syria in spring 2011. The Arab League and Turkey followed several 
months later by imposing sanctions too. Such cases of economic sanctions 
appeared on a regular basis in the news during the last months. Indeed, 
international economic negative sanctions are a common and recurring tool used 
in order to influence another state’s behavior without resorting to a military 
conflict. They have been used for thousands of years and grew in popularity since 
the end of the Cold War. The study of sanctions tends to focus on sanctions’ 
effectiveness. Indeed, many scholars (Ann Elliott, Kaempfer, Lowenberg, Pape 
and Whang) have concentrated on the characteristics of degrees of success and 
failure of economic sanctions.  
This thesis addresses the economic sanctions phenomenon, notably by describing 
their effect on trade. Indeed, economic pressure is one way through which 
influence might be brought. Economic sanctions are supposed to work by 
inducing some kind of pain on the target country. From this perspective, trade 
sanctions and more particularly embargoes should deprive the target country of 
some gains of trade and provoke a lower social economic welfare. However, in a 
globalized world, it is interesting to see how economic sanctions really affect 
trade between the different actors involved. Moreover, given the costs that 
economic sanctions imply, it is interesting to review processes leading to their 
imposition. 
This thesis provides some theoretical insights as well as empirical evidence on the 
economic sanctions phenomenon. Its objective is to better apprehend the 
economic sanctions phenomenon by explaining and, then, confronting their 
theoretical effect on trade and their imposition to empirical evidence. It is divided 
into three sections. The first section introduces the subject by presenting the 
history of economic sanctions, the institutional law framework from which they 
stem from and key notions about sanctions. The second part introduces models 
and the related literature insights to understand the imposition of economic 
sanctions and the effect of an embargo on trade. Finally, the final section of this 
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thesis introduces empirical studies on the effect of economic sanctions. Two types 
of studies are discussed: econometric studies and case studies. The cases studies 
describe the effect of economic sanctions based on descriptive statistics.  
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1 Historical and Institutional Framework 
The first section of this thesis describes the background to economic sanctions, 
going from history to the essential notions about economic sanctions, without 
forgetting the institutional law framework. The first chapter reviews the history of 
economic sanctions by highlighting striking facts. The content of the second 
chapter gives some insight about the institutional law framework from which 
economic sanctions result from. Finally, the third chapter reviews essential 
notions about economic sanctions in order to give to the reader main tools for 
understanding the future developments of this thesis. 
1.1  History 
Economic sanctions, in one form or another, have been used for thousands of 
years. Already in the Greek empire, Athens sanctioned Megara, by imposing a 
trade embargo thanks to the Pericles’ decree of 432 BC which finally led to the 
Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) (Eaton and Engers, 1999, p.409). During 
colonialism in America, the British put pressure on the colonists, in order to 
weaken trade between the colonists and the West Indies (McGee, 2004, p.53). As 
Renwick observed, “States since time immemorial had interrupted commercial 
relations or sought to withhold essential supplies when in a state of war or near 
war with one another.” (Renwick, 1981, p.4). Since the 18th century, embargoes 
were used in order to settle trade rivalry between great powers (Ferrand, 2004, 
p.55). For instance, during Napoleonic Wars, in response to the British naval 
blockade, Napoleon used a large-scale embargo, beginning in 1806 and well-
known as the Continental System or Continental Blockade. The latter consisted in 
a prohibition of trade with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. In view of the dangers to American shipping, Thomas Jefferson and the 
Congress of the United States followed by imposing a general embargo based on 
the Embargo Act of 1807 against Great Britain and France. In the 19th century, 
“economic sanctions consisted primarily of pacific blockades – blockades that 
involved the deployment of a naval force by a country or coalition of countries to 
interrupt commercial intercourse with certain ports or coasts of a state, with which 
these countries were not at war.” (Davis and Engerman, 2003, p.188). Even 
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though most naval blockades implicated wars, pacific blockades developed into a 
coercive tool over time, intended to coerce recalcitrant states to pay off their debts, 
often reparations, and to adjudicate other international disputes. Powers that had 
much stronger armed forces than those of the targeted nations were generally the 
initiators of such blockades. In total, 21 pacific blockades were deployed from 
1827 until the outbreak of World War I. These blockades were generally activated 
by powerful European nations against smaller, less powerful or even 
underdeveloped nations in Europe, Latin America and Asia (Renwick, 1981, pp.5-
6 and Davis and Engerman, 2003, pp.188-189). 
The 20
th
 century sounds the death knell for the resort to armed force, except for 
self-defense practiced on a temporary basis, through Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
Charter of the United Nations (Ferrand, 2004, p.60). The modern theory of 
economic sanctions stems from the creation of the League of Nations (Renwick, 
1981, p.4). Within this organization allowing the use of coercive measures, non-
military measures included as an alternative to the use of force, a formal legal 
discussion of the legitimacy of pacific blockades started (Majlessi, 1999, p.7 and 
Davis and Engerman, 2003, p.189). Article 16 of the League’s Covenant 
constituted the root of power for deploying sanctions in the case of the League of 
Nations. Four collective sanctions episodes were undertaken under the League of 
Nations against Yugoslavia in 1921, Greece in 1925, Paraguay and Bolivia 
between 1932 and 1935 and Italy in 1935-1936 (Davis and Engerman, 2003, 
p.189). After World War II, the United Nations took over the League of Nations. 
Since the 1970s, economic statecraft won back its popularity as a tool of foreign 
policy (Lenway, 1988, p.397). Today, international economic sanctions are used 
as a common and recurring feature of international relations. More precisely, since 
the Berlin Wall fell, economic sanctions have become a usual instrument of the 
United Nations Security Council (Caruso, 2003, p.2). As an illustration, the UN 
Security Council approved only two mandatory sanctions prior to 1990 (Cold War 
period): against Rhodesia and South Africa. Then, the 1990s became the decade 
of sanctions. Indeed, no less than 15 cases were registered, as for instance, against 
Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti, Somalia, and Liberia, the UNITA 
faction in Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
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allowed the United Nations to act more aggressively in international affairs and 
led to an increasing use of economic sanctions (Elliott and Hufbauer, 1999, p.403). 
The end of tension between East and West allowed the United Nations to plays 
actively its role within the international community. 
1.2  Institutional Law Framework 
In an increasing mondialisation framework, issues related to public international 
law and international relations become more important but also more complex. 
The news reminds us of this every day. As regards economic sanctions, the 
marked increase over the last few decades in the rhythm with which they have 
been imposed suggests that a main institutional shift in international relations has 
taken place (Davis and Engerman, 2003, p.196). The aim of this chapter is to 
understand better the actual situation, by reviewing the public international law, 
but also the history leading to the actual institutional framework. 
First, subchapter 1.2.1 addresses the public international law framework. This step 
allows us to understand better the basic principles regulating states’ relations 
worldwide. Second, subchapter 1.2.2 analyzes in more depth the evolution from 
war to the prohibition of the threat or use of force at the international level. 
Thirdly, subchapter 1.2.3 returns to the international organizations framework 
issued from public international law and its role. Lastly, subchapter 1.2.4 comes 
back on the creation and the implementation of the League of Nations and then 
the United Nations. 
1.2.1 Public International Law1 
Public international law is defined as the body of restrictive rules in force at the 
international level. The public international law’s prime function is an ordering 
function. It essentially governs relations between States, simplifies international 
cooperation and makes international cooperation predictable due to the restrictive 
rules that it establishes. Nowadays, it is considered as the law of the international 
community with its main aim being to ensure peace and stability. Public 
international law has been created by States for States. It comprises the 
                                                 
1
 Subchapter mainly inspired from Ziegler, (2011). 
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international customary, general principles of international law and treaties closed 
either between States, international organizations or between States and 
international organizations (Ziegler, 2011, p.3). In the public international law’s 
view, each State, great or small, rich or poor, is considered as sovereign and set on 
an equal footing of equality towards other States. Therefore, States are 
independent of each other. At the international level, the democratic element lies 
in the equality between states’ principle. Each State is free to decide without 
appeal to accede or not, to a negotiated treaty. 
Concerning rules, it is important to notice that once rules are enacted, sanctions 
have to be defined. The notion of sanction refers to the penalty that is imposed on 
rule’s violators. Thus, in public international law, sanction constitutes “the range 
of reactions adopted unilaterally or collectively by States against the author of an 
internationally illicit fact in order to ensure the respect and the execution of a right 
or an obligation.” 2  Sanctions are based on a collective responsibility notion, 
because of the fact that applied sanctions affect all individuals within the targeted 
state (Gagné, 2005, p.25). Regarding collective security, mechanisms have been 
elaborated in order to sanction a threat against peace or collective security. One of 
the norms issued from public international law formulates the interdiction to 
resort to armed force. Indeed, governments have to settle their disputes with 
peaceful means. 
1.2.2 From War to the Prohibition of the Threat or Use 
of Force 
States’ territorial sovereignty has been recognized for centuries but its absolute 
protection is safeguarded only since the prohibition of the use of force. As well, 
international sanctions implemented against a State are admitted for centuries by 
the international customary. However, until the end of the 19
th
 century, States 
preferred wars before they adopted another position. The aim of this subchapter is 
to review the process behind the prohibition of the threat or use of force, in order 
to understand how states switched from wars to economic sanctions. 
                                                 
2
 Salmon, (2001); in Gagné, (2005), p.9; we translate. 
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Blockades and embargoes have been used in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. Until the 
20
th
 century, States could engage in war under particular circumstances (jus ad 
bellum).
3
 However, from the 19
th
 century, a movement started, trying to restrict 
eligibility of wars (bellum justum).
4
 Nevertheless, the first enacted rules 
concerned the diminution of acts of violence and penalties issuing from the 
conflict itself (jus in bello).
5
 This process has been pursued at the end of the 19
th
 
century with the introduction of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement 
of Disputes (1899) which has been revised at the Second Hague Peace Conference 
in 1907 (Ziegler, 2011, p.37 and Sohn, 1981, p.155). Moreover, several decades 
later, on the initiative of non-aligned member countries of the United Nations, the 
Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1982) 
was elaborated and then adopted by consensus by the General Assembly. Thanks 
to this declaration, constituting a normative text, a complete scheme and a 
consolidation of the legal framework of peaceful settlement of international 
disputes had been developed.
6
 Then, the 20
th
 century has been marked by the 
concepts of collective security and war’s prevention. The concept of collective 
security, that belongs more to the international relations’ discipline, refers to “a 
system, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the 
security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to 
threats to, and breaches of, the peace.” (Lowe and others, 2008; in De Wet and 
Wood, 2012, p.316). The 20
th
 century, with the creation of the League of Nations 
and the United Nations, marked time for legal and institutional discussions about 
collective security and sanctions in modern times (Davis and Engerman, 2003, 
p.189). Before turning to the League of Nations and the United Nations in details, 
the role of international organizations in the sanctioning process will be discussed. 
                                                 
3
 Jus ad bellum defines the acceptable justification to engage in war. 
4
 Bellum justum is also called the just war theory. 
5
 Jus in bello defines the limits to acceptable wartime conduct. 
6
 Source : http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/mdpsid/mdpsid.html 
  
16 
1.2.3 Role of International Organizations7 
As Drezner wrote: “Even though norms and principles may exist without an 
institutional reference, they are more likely to be embedded within international 
organizations; indeed, international organizations are often created with the 
expressed purpose of promoting specific norms.” (Drezner, 2000, p.82). Coming 
into existence in the 19
th
 century, it is only since the second part of the 20
th
 
century that the number of international organizations grew rapidly. Since then, 
they have been assuming a role being more and more important what led to the 
recognition of international organizations as subjects of law (derived subjects of 
international law since they exist, thanks to the desire of two or more States). In 
addition, States accept to delegate a part of their sovereignty to the international 
organizations within which they are members. Thus, the international 
organizations’ law became a full-fledged branch of international law. International 
organizations’ law comprises constitutive treaties and legal acts 8  linking 
organizations and/or States together (Ziegler, 2011, pp.4-5). They have been 
created by States for a set purpose, ones that they cannot achieve on their own 
means. International organizations play an important role in the public 
international law framework because they take more and more often responsibility 
for tasks that States had always assumed solely in the past. The total or almost all 
legal multilateral instruments are negotiated in the framework of international 
organizations. The latter have become the cradle of public international law.  
International institutions such as international organizations take on a significant 
role in the process of multilateral sanctions. As Drezner noticed in the case of 
multilateral sanctions: “International organizations play a decisive role in 
sustaining cooperation over time; they also suggest the mechanism through which 
this is accomplished. International organizations maintain cooperation not through 
the ex post punishment of defectors but through the ex ante reassurance of actors 
by developing common conjectures and blunting domestic pressures to defect.” 
(Drezner, 2000, p.75). It is important to notice that multilateral sanctions that are 
                                                 
7
 Subchapter mostly inspired from Ziegler, (2011). 
8
 As they are based on constitutive treaties of international organizations, these legal acts are 
considered as secondary law or derived law. 
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sustained by international organizations are significantly more effective than 
unilateral sanctions. Again, as Drezner explained: “Members of the sanctions 
coalition are forced to add the costs and benefits of supporting the organization to 
the payoffs involved in sanctioning. States that value the existence and 
maintenance of international organizations will be less willing to violate a 
previous commitment.” (Drezner, 2000, p.98). Wavering States find means for 
resisting domestic pressures in the international organizations framework. An 
international organization through its presence and its support can improve the 
situation linked with defection problems. Indeed, international organizations raise 
the flow of information that diminishes monitoring costs and helps to identify free 
riders (Drezner, 2000, p.86 and p.99). Moreover, international organizations 
prevent backsliding by reassuring member States that a cooperative equilibrium 
will be maintained; more specifically in reassuring States about each other’s aims 
owing to the development of shared mutual conjectures and the palliation of 
domestic political pressures on States’ leaders. As a result, institutionalized 
cooperation should induce greater concessions by diminishing the likelihood of 
backsliding and by forestalling free riding (Drezner, 2000, p.87). Lastly, thanks to 
these former elements, international organizations diminish the interest that States 
have about the probability of other States defecting what implies a reinforcement 
in the common conjecture of continued cooperation. Consequently, the support of 
international organizations can transform frail cooperation equilibrium into a 
more robust one. As regards targeted countries, the latter will make concessions in 
response to institutionalized sanctions, while they will be more tempted to wait 
out ad hoc coalitions. 
Nevertheless, the creation of international organizations or agencies very often 
follows the adoption of agreements. They constitute the institutional framework 
by providing tools for the implementation of the previously adopted conventions 
or treaties to the organization’s member states. In order to understand better how 
it works, some relevant agreements as well as organizations linked with the non-
proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, one of the motives mentioned above 
for the imposition of economic sanctions, can be found in the Appendix.  
  
18 
Lastly, the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, probably the 
two most well-known international organizations worldwide with respect to 
peacekeeping and their respective institutional frameworks related to economic 
sanctions are presented below. 
1.2.4 The League of Nations and the United Nations 
The League of Nations, established in 1919, being the first organ that dealt with 
international affairs in an institutional way, had been created following the First 
World War. It resulted from the desire of various countries to find an alternative 
to the use of unilateral force in order to implement peacekeeping. Its vocation was 
universal, even though only 28 States were members; the United States not being 
one of those members.
9
 This organization pursued the following goals: 
disarmament, prevention of war through collective security, setting of disputes 
between countries through negotiations, diplomacy, arbitration, and judicial 
settlement of international disputes, and improvement of global welfare (De Wet 
and Wood, 2012, p.317). The League of Nations has been a pioneer in the 
development of multilateral economic sanctions. The objectives of its sanctions 
were to isolate a State that would have violated rules issued from the Pact in 
depriving it from every commercial and financial means. The organization tried to 
introduce a partial interdiction to war through Articles 12 to 25 of its Pact. The 
latter made provision for decentralized and collective sanctions, being either 
military or non-military, in order to ensure a behavior complying with the 
established standards (Gagné, 2005, pp.36-39). However, several weaknesses 
appeared. First, the League Covenant did not endeavor to banish the unilateral use 
of force. Second, it lacked a system for central decision-making and for the 
enforcement of sanctions (De Wet and Wood, 2012, p.317). Indeed, the League 
Covenant acted as an advisor that could only express recommendations and 
notifications. In addition, members had the responsibility to determine whether 
the preliminary conditions of Article 16 were fulfilled. Therefore, if a State 
considered that no act of war took place, it was not forced to implement the 
                                                 
9
 It is interesting to notice that Woodrow Wilson (US president from 1913 to 1921 and Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1919) instigated the League of Nations’ creation but that the United States was not a 
member of the latter. Indeed, the Congress refused the membership in the League of Nations. 
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sanctioning measures enounced under Article 16. The implementation of this 
Article was left to the subjectivity and to the unilateral interpretation of the 
League of Nations’ members. That is the reason why this system was considered 
as horizontal (no central decision-making organ). Nevertheless, the Locarno Pact 
(1925) and then the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) were adopted in order to 
supplement the existing provisions and, particularly for the second, to prohibit the 
use of force. Notwithstanding, the League of Nations has been disbanded in 1946. 
The horizontal system could not get through national interests; this made 
international cooperation and the sanctioning system much less effective (De Wet 
and Wood, 2012, p.317; Gagné, 2005, pp.40-41 and Majlessi, 1999, pp.32-34). 
The system governing international relations since 1945 must be understood as a 
reaction to the failure of the League of Nations and as an effort, in order to protect 
themselves against a repetition of the multiple wars that had been witnessed. The 
objective in creating the United Nations and in establishing its Charter (1945) was 
not to repeat the errors of the past and, more particularly, to maintain international 
peace (Ziegler, 2011, p.41). As a result, the decentralized system of the League of 
Nations was totally removed. Indeed, the founders of the UN Charter wanted to 
create a legal regime that would bind States. In order to achieve their objectives, 
they centralized the decision power into one organ, the Security Council. In fact, 
substantial enforcement powers are given to the Security Council via many 
provisions in the UN Charter. As enounced in the UN Charter, the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council is “the maintenance of international peace 
and security.”10 Thanks to this process, the solidarity notion should prevail over 
the individualities of sovereignties (Gagné, 2005, p.45 and Majlessi, 1999, pp.32-
34).  
The recognition of a true interdiction of the use of force has been done through 
the adoption of Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the United Nations Charter. The 
UN Charter proclaims under Article 2, paragraph 4: “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
                                                 
10
 Source: http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/index.shtml  
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inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”11 This Article forms a part 
of the customary law and has an erga omnes
12
 characteristic nowadays. The 
Articles 2(4), 39, 41, 42, 43 and 46 of the UN Charter (1945) as well as the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) constitute the two sources of powers for 
implementing and enforcing sanctions, with armed forces if necessary, for the 
United Nations (Davis and Engerman, 2003, p.189). In practice, “the Security 
Council can call for collective economic sanctions under Article 41 of the UN 
Charter if it has first been determined, under Article 39, the existence of a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and if the sanctions are 
imposed to maintain or restore international peace and security.” (Segall, 1999, 
p.763). Moreover, measures taken by the Security Council (Art. 41) are 
mandatory. It means that member states have the obligation under Article 25 to 
implement the Security Council decisions. Most of the time, resolutions indicate 
recommendations that Members should use in order to settle their disputes 
(Chapter VI, Art. 36 and 37). Lastly, the Security Council can use regional 
agreements (Chapter VIII) such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
13
 in order to implement sanctions. 
Nevertheless, the United Nations system does demonstrate some weaknesses. 
First, as de Wet and Wood explain, the Chapter VII mechanism is extremely 
contingent: not all obvious violations of fundamental principles of international 
law activate it as well as other motives can activate it. Furthermore, even when it 
is triggered, member states are not always willing to sanction a violating state. It 
happens that the violating state is one of their political allies. Two situations can 
happen here: either, the mechanism is interrupted by a lack of majority of 9 out of 
15 votes (Article 27(2)) or by 1 of the 5 permanent members that would use its 
veto power (Article 27(3)) (de Wet and Wood, 2012, p.5 and Gagné, 2005, p.55). 
Some recent examples illustrate the latter case. For instance, Russia and China 
used their veto power when the Security Council was deliberating taking action on 
                                                 
11
 Charter of the United Nations. Source: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 
12
 An erga omnes right or obligation is owed toward all. 
13
 For more information about OSCE, NATO and ISAF : http://www.osce.org/, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm and http://www.isaf.nato.int/ 
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Syria in February 2012.
14
 Despite the states’ equality principle and Article 27 that 
provides a vote’s right for every member state being in the Security Council, there 
is a de jure
15
 inequality between small and great powers. Indeed, Article 27(3) 
institutionalizes the preferential status of the permanent states by the recognition 
of a veto power. Indeed, victors of World War II wanted to administer peace on 
their own. That is the reason why they decided to give this veto power to 
themselves and to some Allies such as the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United 
States and China. Therefore, the five permanent members (United States, United 
Kingdom, China, Russia and France) own a veto power on all matter of substance 
(Gagné, 2005, pp.57-58). Moreover, under Article 27(3), it is written that: “[…] 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, 
a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”16 Thus, whether a permanent state 
is party to a dispute, because of its mandatory abstention (Article 27(3)), no 
decision can be taken and no sanction can ever be implemented against this state. 
During the Cold War period (1947-1991), the Security Council was mainly 
paralyzed by the veto power and could only decide upon sanctions in situations 
where none of the five permanent members, particularly United States and USSR, 
or their protégés were involved (Gagné, 2005, pp.57-63). This explains on the one 
hand the frequent unilateral use of sanctions from the United States at that time 
and on the other hand the increasing use of sanctions within the United Nations 
framework since 1990, after the fall of Berlin Wall (1989). Lastly, the number of 
states sitting in the Security Council has been strongly criticized in recent years. 
Effectively, the 15 members (included the 5 permanent members) have been 
representatives as the United Nations was composed of 50 member states. 
Nevertheless, now that this number reaches 193, the question concerning the 
number of members in the Security Council, and particularly its increase, is 
relevant.
17
  
                                                 
14
 Source: http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/3cb3360a-4f61-11e1-b918-
64dce5760e8a/La_Russie_et_la_Chine_bloquent_une_r%C3%A9solution_sur_la_Syrie 
15
 De jure means « concerning law ». 
16
 Source : http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml  
17
 Source: http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/8dee0992-8cb4-11e1-8339-
b73853b1489c/La_Suisse_sactive_pour_r%C3%A9former_le_Conseil_de_s%C3%A9curit%C3%
A9 
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To conclude this section, even if an official institutional framework exists, the 
divergent national interests, the political influence and the search for influence in 
a multi-polar world are no doubt problematic in achieving cooperation among 
states and, therefore, constitute the roots of the problem. Nevertheless, if the 
Security Council and the United Nations want to win back their credibility and 
have a proper-working and transparent system of sanctions, they need to change 
some elements of their system. First, they need to abolish the veto power that has 
no reason to exist anymore nowadays. Second, they should increase the number of 
members sitting in the Security Council. Finally, they need to be more transparent 
and to let emerging countries as well as other small countries having the 
opportunity to exercise their rights and power within the Security Council. 
1.3 Essential Notions about Sanctions 
Now that we have some insights about the history of economic sanctions and the 
institutional legal framework from which they stem from, let us turn to the 
essential notions about sanctions.  
In the literature, scholars distinguish two types of sanctions used in international 
relations: positive and negative sanctions. Positive sanctions
18
 take the form of 
actual or promised rewards (humanitarian aid, tariff’s reduction or tariff’s 
abolition and so on) whereas negative sanctions are the use or threatened use of 
punishments. As Baldwin noticed in his book Economic Statecraft, both types of 
sanctions constitute means to exercise power and particularly to foster cooperation 
among countries (Baldwin, 1985, p.20). We will focus on negative sanctions in 
this thesis. 
                                                 
18
 The notions of positive and negative sanctions come from sociology. A positive sanction 
rewards or promise to reward someone (a state, a group, etc.) for following a norm and serves to 
promote the initiation and continuation of a certain type of behavior.  On the contrary, a negative 
sanction, threatened or already implemented, is a tool to express somebody (society, regime, etc.) 
the non-approval of its particular behavior. As Baldwin explains, although the definitions appear 
simple enough, there are conceptual and empirical difficulties in distinguish them. Positive 
sanctions are actual or promised improvements of an actor’s value position relative to his 
expectations’ baseline. On the contrary, negative sanctions constitute actual or threatened 
deprivations relative to the expectations’ baseline. (Baldwin, (1971) “The Power of Positive 
Sanctions”, World Politics, 24(1), pp.19-38). 
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There are three main strategies of international economic pressure: economic 
sanctions, trade wars and economic warfare
19
 (Garoupa and Gata, 2002, p.43 and 
Pape, 1997, p.93). Economic sanctions constitute an indispensable instrument of 
United Nations efforts in order to maintain international peace and security. 
Indeed, they constitute tools of foreign policy that is somewhere on a continuum 
between totally unrestricted international exchange and war at the other end of the 
spectrum (Spindler, (1995); in Eyler, (2007), p.10). As Pape defines, “economic 
sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by 
reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government, this to 
change its political behaviour.” (Pape, 1997, pp.93-94).  
Sanctions can coerce either directly or indirectly. In the first case, the sanctions’ 
goal will be, to convince the target country that the issues at stake are not worth 
the price. In the second case, sanctions can induce popular pressure to force the 
government to concede or lead to a popular revolt that topples the government, 
resulting in the establishment of a new government that will make the concessions.  
Sanctions can be used against countries, political parties, non-profit organizations, 
companies and individuals. In the empirical section, we will focus on relations 
between states or countries. The expressions “sender” and “target” denote 
respectively “the country that imposes sanctions and the country that receives the 
economic punishment” (Caruso, 2003, p.4). We can look at economic sanctions in 
regard to: the kind of sanctions, the objective and the actors involved (Caruso, 
2003, p.4). 
We distinguish three types of economic sanctions: trade sanctions in the forms of 
total or partial embargoes
20
; investment or financial sanctions and more narrowly-
targeted sanctions, so-called “smart sanctions” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, 
p.869). Interdictions of transport and communication can be added to this last 
                                                 
19
 “A trade war is when a state threatens to inflict economic harm or actually inflicts it in order to 
convince the target state to agree to terms of trade more favourable to the coercing state. […] 
Economic warfare seeks to weaken an adversary’s aggregate economic potential in order to 
weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an ongoing war”. (Pape, 
(1997), p.94). 
20
 It is interesting to note that the distinction between a boycott and an embargo in juridical terms 
comes from the fact that a boycott will be imposed on the initiative of private and non-state actors 
while an embargo is a disposition of the state.  (Osieja H., Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of 
U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the U.S. Embargo against Cuba, USA, 2006, p.61). 
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category of measures. Analyzing more precisely trade sanctions, both an import 
and an export embargo implemented against a target country restrict the volume 
of specific imported and exported products by setting a maximum amount of 
goods authorized for import and export. This illustrates the case of a partial 
embargo such as on military equipment, diamonds or weapons of mass destruction. 
In the most extreme case, such as a total embargo, they prohibit the complete 
importation and exportation of goods (Bonarriva, Koscielski and Wilson, 2009, 
p.2 and Davis and Engerman, 2003, pp.190-191). The literature denotes the use of 
selective and comprehensive sanctions. Selective sanctions refer to restrictions on 
particular goods or financial flows such as partial trade embargoes whereas 
comprehensive sanctions are global sanctions. Finally, as regards export 
restrictions, a last distinction can be made. Indeed, we can distinguish export 
quotas, exposed above, from export licenses. The latter “establish that an 
application or other documentation should be submitted as a condition for 
exportation and depending on whether license acquisition is automatic, the 
requirements may affect the volume of exports.” (Kim, 2010, p.6). 
Box 1 Methods of Administering an Export Embargo and an Import Quota. 
Export embargoes, usually enforced through a licensing system, the so-called export 
control regimes, create a rent that can be distributed to either the government or the 
exporters of the sender country. The method of administering a quota can make a great 
deal of difference as to its effects. This will depend on the behavior of the government. If 
the latter would auction off the export licenses for their premium value, then it would 
benefit from the rent. On the other hand, in case of free issuing of export licenses, the rent 
would be got by the sender country’s exporters. 
Whether the allocation is administered on a political basis, then potential firms will have 
an incentive to spend resources in competing for these rents. As a result, the rent’s 
existence generates incentives for rent-seeking behavior: interest groups lobbying for 
sanctions (Czaga, 2004, p.29 and Kim, 2010, p.12). 
Senders use import embargoes to lower the demand for some particular products 
from the target country. Furthermore, the idea is to attempt to decrease the target’s 
foreign exchange earnings and thus its capacity to purchase goods. Moreover, it is 
also used to provoke damage to a specific sector or industry of the target state. 
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This type of measures is commonly criticized for its ineffectiveness. In fact, target 
countries are able to adapt and find alternative markets or organize triangular 
purchases to bypass import controls. On the contrary, the export embargo 
constitutes the most common technique. The exports can be prohibited partially or 
totally. Embargoes are normally enforced by a system of export licenses and 
supporting measures. At last, investment or financial sanctions take the forms of 
restrictions on capital flows, in other words, they “restrict or suspend lending and 
investing into target economy” and, sometimes, can be in the form of mandatory 
disinvestment (Caruso, 2003, pp.4-5). Moreover, foreign assets of the target 
country may be frozen. In order to forestall sanction-busting, financial sanctions 
also impose subsidiary restrictions on international payments (Caruso, 2003, pp.4-
5). In addition to these quoted measures, other sanctions, part of the so-called 
“smart sanctions” or “targeted sanctions” are used. Examples from the practice are 
“freezing the offshore assets of individual members of the target nation’s ruling 
elite, or travel bans on government officials and party cadres” (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 2007, p.869). Smart sanctions will be review more deeply in Box 2. 
Table 1 Definitions and Types of Sanctions. 
Economic sanctions 
Means to express power and to foster cooperation among countries. 
 Positive sanctions Negative sanctions 
Actual or promised rewards Actual or threatened punishment 
Trade 
sanctions 
- Tariff’s reduction 
- Tariff’s abolition 
- Partial embargo 
- Total embargo 
Investment or 
financial 
sanctions 
- Financial or investment aid 
from different entities such as 
the International Monetary 
Fund,  the World Bank or 
countries 
- Restriction on capital flows (restrict or   
suspend lending) 
- Mandatory disinvestment 
- Restrictions on international payments 
- Freezing of assets 
Targeted 
sanctions 
- Humanitarian aid - Interdiction of transports 
- Interdiction of communication 
- Travel bans 
When looking at the objective of the sanctions, the US government gives the 
following grounds as reasons for the imposition of sanctions: boycott activity, 
communism, transition to democracy, environmental activity, expropriation, 
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harboring war criminals, human rights, market reform, military aggression, 
narcotic’s activity, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction terrorism and 
worker’s rights (McGee, 2004, p.55). One more objective that can be set out is the 
freeing of captured citizens (Davis and Engerman, 2003, p.190). 
Finally, regarding to the number of actors involved, we can distinguish unilateral 
from multilateral sanctions (the notions “collective” sanctions is used in law).21 In 
the case of unilateral sanctions, usually only one country imposes sanctions 
against a target country, whereas in the case of multilateral sanctions, more than 
one country imposes sanctions against a targeted nation. In this case, other 
countries (secondary senders) may follow a “promoter” country, called a primary 
sender, or the choice of an economic sanction is promulgated by the international 
organization itself and adopted within its framework (Caruso, 2003, p.4). 
However, notions are a bit different in the law’s point of view. As Majlessi 
noticed, “they [unilateral sanctions] may be implemented by international 
organizations (as in the case when an international organization with limited 
membership imposes sanctions against a non-member state) or by a group of 
states through intergovernmental cooperation [often through regional 
organizations]” (Majlessi, 1999, p.8). In these special cases, when a group of 
States is acting as a single unit, the sanctions would be defined as “organized 
unilateral sanctions” (Kuyper, 1990, supra note 13 at 145; in Majlessi, 1999, p.8). 
The Arab oil embargo adopted in 1973 was an example of such a unilateral 
sanction. Likewise, centralized sanctions are sanctions “decided upon by the 
competent organ of an international organization” (i.e. Security Council) 
(Majlessi, 1999, p.10). Lastly, most of the time, the initiative in imposing 
international sanctions is initiated by one government or association of 
governments such as the European Union. 
  
                                                 
21
 In international law, sanctions can be distinguished through their decentralized (or horizontal) 
characteristic or their centralized (or institutionalized or vertical) characteristic. In the first case, 
each state, member of an organization, is free to implement or not the sanctions while, in the 
second case, member states of an organization have the obligation to implement sanctions, once 
they have been decided by a the organization’s decision-making organ. Gagné, (2005), p.24. 
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Box 2 Smart Sanctions. 
Nowadays, after the different criticisms against comprehensive sanctions, because of their 
humanitarian effects on the civilian populations, and more particularly after the 
comprehensive sanctions episode against Iraq in the early 1990s, the trend is to use smart 
sanctions. Smart sanctions, also defined as targeted sanctions, are “the precision-guided 
munitions of economic statecraft” (Drezner, 2010, p.2). There is a variety of actors, a 
range of legal entities included, that are targeted by smart sanctions. They can be 
individuals as for instance key decision makers, government officials or family members 
of these individuals, military organizations going from conventional armed forces to 
guerillas, political organizations, corporate entities from both, private and public sectors, 
and other non-state entities. These targeted entities can be targeted by smart sanctions 
simply because of their exercise of some activity prohibited by the UN Security Council 
or their suspected relationships with terrorist organizations (Drezner, 2011, p.97 and 
Watson Institute for International Studies (WIIS), 2006, p.21). Moreover, they can also be 
targeted because of their support for primary targeted entities. 
The aim of smart sanctions is to alter the behavior of precise actors (Wallensteen, 
Eriksson and Staibano, 2003, p.91). Defenders of targeted sanctions claim that “economic 
coercion has had such a poor past record of success because they have often missed the 
locus of the target state’s offending policies: the policy elite.” As a consequence, smart 
sanctions’ objective is to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime as well as the 
targeted regime itself, while imposing minimal damage on the population (Drezner, 2010, 
p.2). In this perspective, they are directed not only against the above-referred entities but 
also against resources that are indispensable for the targeted regime’s rule. The focus on 
specific actors and specific resources constitute the key features of targeted sanctions 
(Wallensteen, Eriksson and Staibano, 2003, p.iii and p.91). 
Smart sanctions consist of arms embargoes, targeted financial sanctions, travel bans, 
restrictions on flight connections, representation restrictions, asset’s freezes and 
restrictions on particular good and services notably certain natural resource and processed 
commodities such as diamonds, timber, oil, arms, spare parts of particular products 
(Drezner, 2010, p.4 and Wallensteen, Eriksson and Staibano, 2003, p.91). They should be 
used only when the domestic political economy of the target country is conceivable. 
Moreover, smart sanctions are commonly used either as incentives to change behavior or 
as preventive measures. It is argued that by affecting the material inducements of 
powerful supporters, the latter will eventually press the targeted authorities into making 
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concessions. Indeed, smart sanctions should increase the target country’s costs of 
noncompliance while averting the collateral hardship that comprehensive trade 
embargoes imply (Drezner, 2010, pp.2-4). 
Finally, smart sanctions have been the subject of a dialogue at the international level 
between 1998 and 2003. Indeed, a series of conferences on smart sanctions, where 
delegates from the United Nations, government and the private sector regrouped, started 
in 1998. This series of conferences, whose aim was to determine methods of applying 
sanctions in a more efficient and targeted way, constituted a period of reflection on smart 
sanctions. In total, three so-called processes took place: the Interlaken Process, the Bonn-
Berlin Process and the Stockholm Process. Each process focused on an aspect of smart 
sanctions. The Interlaken Process dealt with issue of targeted financial sanctions while the 
Bonn-Berlin Process concentrated on arms embargoes, travel bans and aviation sanctions. 
Finally, the Stockholm Process focused on practical feasibility of implementing and 
monitoring targeted sanctions. Thanks to the development and the use of targeted 
sanctions, many politic problems that had been created previously because of the use of 
comprehensive trade sanctions have been solved. Targeted sanctions serve now as a key 
instrument for policy coordination among the medium and great powers as well as for the 
global civil society (WIIS, 2006, pp.5-6). Their performance can be evaluated by looking 
at the humanitarian costs and state compliance’s results obtained with the use of smart 
sanctions compared to the use of comprehensive sanctions (Drezner, 2010, p.6.). 
Moreover, as Drezner noticed: “The evidence provides moderate support for smart 
sanctions being more humane but less effective than more comprehensive measures. 
Recent research on the impact of economic coercion in the target country would appear to 
support the humanitarian arguments in favor of smart sanctions.” (Drezner, 2010, pp.6-7). 
However, smart sanctions owe their specific problems. First, the imposition of targeted 
sanctions has proven to be arduous in practice. One example is the difficulty that both the 
American Government and the United Nations had to confiscate the personal assets held 
by Saddam Hussein and his family before the second Gulf War (Major and McGann, 
2005, p.341). As well, Wallensteen, Eriksson and Staibano enumerated the following key 
problems in targeting the targeted actors: “[…] the identification of the actor, determining 
which resources should be subject to sanctions, the counter-reactions of the targeted 
actor, and the ability and willingness of third states to make the sanctions effective.” 
(Wallensteen, Eriksson and Staibano, 2003, p.92). Moreover, the increasing use of 
targeted sanctions during the past years generated new issues linked to the rights and 
standing of parties that might be listed wrongly. In addition, several member states 
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pointed out the lack of due process and the absence of transparency associated with 
listing and delisting (WIIS, 2006, pp.5-6). Besides, as Drezner wrote: “[…], there is no 
systematic evidence that smart sanctions yield better policy results vis-à-vis the targeted 
country. Indeed, in many ways, the smart sanctions framework has been too successful.” 
(Drezner, 2011, p.97). Effectively, the accuracy of targeting determines the solidity of the 
entire chain of implementation measures. Likewise, requests for more comprehensive and 
more coercive sanctions are likely to arise if smart sanctions do not achieve their 
objectives (Wallensteen, Eriksson and Staibano, 2003, p.92). Lastly, recent research 
suggests that alternatives other than targeted sanctions should be considered in some 
cases. In conclusion, scholars and policymakers should analyze the smart sanctions 
framework and determine the conditions under which different types of economics 
statecraft should be used (Drezner, 2011, p.97).  
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2 The Theory of International Economics: an 
Application to Economic Sanctions 
The second part of this work presents models in order to understand the whole 
sanctioning process from the implementation of economic sanctions to the effects 
of an embargo on trade. Chapter 2.1 explains the effects of an embargo on trade 
by presenting both a surplus analysis and an international trade perspective based 
on an offer curves modeling system. Chapter 2.2 presents a public choice model 
from Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) describing, on the one hand, the sender 
domestic decision of implementation of an embargo, and, on the other hand, the 
target domestic decision of adopting a deviant policy behavior. Chapter 2.3 
focuses on the sanctioning process itself. First, the reason why a coalition of 
countries implements sanctions against a target country is overviewed thanks to 
results from game theory. Second, the formation of a coalition of sender countries 
and related problems are presented. Third, a common phenomenon in economic 
sanctions, the sanction-busting trade, is presented. Early (2009) examines this 
phenomenon by confronting realism and liberalism theories. 
2.1 Effects on an Embargo on Trade: an International 
Economics Perspective 
Since economic sanctions are trade barriers, models from international economics 
provide the needed insight to understand their effects. More precisely, economic 
sanctions are nontariff barriers to trade, in the form of import and export 
restrictions (voluntary export restraints – VERs) used for changing another state’s 
political choices. Trade sanctions in the forms of bans, quotas and licensing 
requirements constitute exogenous shocks that depress trade. They are 
characterized by a phenomenon of rent-seeking and are confronted to market 
incentives such as trade diversion. As Kaempfer and Lowenberg noted, terms-of-
trade effects mirror the trade sanctions’ economic impacts on the target. These 
effects are theoretically larger in case of multilateral sanctions than unilateral ones. 
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Additionally, the extent of pre-sanctions bilateral trade
22
 between the sender and 
target states constitutes a main component in defining the ease with which the 
target state can get other sources of supply and alternative markets for its 
domestic goods, and consequently, in defining the terms-of-trade effects of the 
sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, pp.868-872). This chapter presents 
economic sanctions’ impact on trade thanks to a surplus analysis (subchapter 2.1.1) 
and an offer curves analysis (subchapter 2.1.2). 
2.1.1 A Surplus Analysis23 
The model presented here provides a basic background. It describes the markets 
of both target and sender countries. After reviewing the initial situation, cases of 
an export embargo and of an import embargo, both implemented by the sender 
country, will be analyzed. Despite their differences, these two types of measures 
have the same objective: deprive the target of the gains from trade (Kirschner, 
1997, p.36). 
Figure 1 presents the initial situation. The following hypotheses are made: 
(H1) There are two countries engaged in trade of the given good: a sender country 
and a target country. Target’s import market mirrors the sender’s export market 
and vice versa. 
(H2) The world market dictates prices. Sender and target countries are both small 
economies, so-called price-takers. As a result, under autarky, supply curves are 
expressed by lines   and demand curves by lines  . Once trade openness occurs, 
demand curves are unchanged whereas supply curves are given by lines   . 
(H3) There is perfect competition. 
(H4) There are no transportation costs and no impediment. 
In case of autarky, we see that consumers of target and sender countries would be 
willing to purchase the quantity    of the offered good at a price    (variables 
with asterisks in the following graphs express domestic equilibrium values). Once, 
trade openness occurs, the initial world equilibrium happens at world price   . 
                                                 
22
 Bilateral trade here represents trade between a sender country and a target country or between a 
coalition of sender countries against a single target country as this is often the case in reality. 
23
 This subchapter is inspired from Eyler, (2007), pp.9-19. 
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Figure 1 Target’s Export Market and Sender’s Import Market. 
 
 
Source: Eyler (2007), p.13. 
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The considered good
24
 becomes exportable for the target, respectively importable 
by the sender as the world price,   , is higher than the target’s domestic price, 
respectively lower than the sender’s domestic price. In the opposite situation, the 
target would have imported the good while the sender would have exported it. The 
quantity supplied,   , and demanded,   , at the world price    define the market 
surplus,        , or shortage,        , at the current world price vis-à-vis 
the situation of autarky. As the world price,   , is higher than the equilibrium 
price resulting from autarky,   , on the target’s export market, the target country 
is a net exporter of the good. Indeed, at price   , producers are willing to sell a 
larger amount of the good,      
  , while domestic consumers are willing to 
consume a smaller amount,      
  .  The market surplus is consequently sold 
to foreign purchasers. The situation is the opposite for the sender country. As 
world price,   , is under the sender’s domestic price, the sender country is a net 
importer, importing the market shortage from the target country. 
The target and sender consumer surplus (triangle   ) and producer surplus 
(triangle   ) formula are given in the respective graphs. The consumer surplus 
corresponds to the difference between the consumer’s willingness to pay and the 
effective price they pay for the given good while the producer surplus equals the 
difference between the price at which producers would be willing to sell their 
good and the price they effectively receive for it. The sum of the consumer and 
producer surplus gives the economic social welfare in terms of surplus of the 
country. We see that the target’s consumers (         ̂            ̂ ) and 
sender’s producers          ̂           ̂   are worse off with trade openness in 
this situation whereas target’s producers          ̂          ̂   and sender’s 
consumers (         ̂            ̂ ) are better off. However, in total, for each 
country, the social welfare increases with trade openness, gains exceeding losses. 
The target net gain equals to the triangle determined by the intersection of 
coordinates                ̂  while for the sender country, its gain equals to 
the triangle                 ̂ . 
                                                 
24
 We use the term ‘good’ for simplicity. 
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2.1.1.1 Effects on an Export Embargo 
In our model, under free trade, consumers purchase the amount    at the world 
price    at the equilibrium.
25
 Assume now that the sender state imposes a partial 
export embargo (the terms embargo, quota and ban will be commonly used here) 
on exports normally destined for the target state. Figure 2 illustrates the export 
sanctions effects. The amount of exports results from the difference of the 
quantity supplied by domestic producers and the quantity purchased by the 
domestic consumers on the domestic market for a given price. In the graph, the 
dark vertical line corresponding to the limited quantity supplied,    , respresents 
the export quota. Indeed, by fixing this maximal saleable quantity, the trade 
surplus exportable by the sender country diminishes going from the amount 
        to the amount            As a consequence, the price in the sender 
exporting country will fall until is equal to quota conditioned corresponding 
supplied level,    . It will reach   , lower than   , the price under free trade. The 
partial embargo’s implementation results in lower revenues for producers. 
Because of the export quota, target’s consumers purchase the amount     at the 
price   . They face higher prices for lower quantities. The net impact on both 
sender and target countries’ welfare is negative in comparison with the free trade 
situation. Targets producers gains area   thanks to additional revenues induced by 
the sender’s export embargo, which, in turn, corresponds to consumers’ loss. 
Areas     and   constitute consumer loss of welfare corresponding to the net 
welfare loss in the target country. On the sender’s side, area   is the gain in 
consumer surplus and the loss in producer surplus while areas     and   represent 
the losses in producer surplus.     and   constitute the net welfare loss in the 
sender economy. On the target’s import side, the partial embargo reduces the 
maximum amount that can be consumed to    . Since the export quota reduces 
the global exported supply, it also raises the import price from    to    in the 
importing targeted state.  
  
                                                 
25
 Note that if you want to compare the graphs below with the initial situation’s graphs, you need 
to reverse the initial situation’s graphs in order to get the sender’s export market and the target’s 
import market. 
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Figure 2 Export Sanctions Effects. 
 
 
 
Source: Eyler (2007), p.18. 
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Lastly, variables with asterisks design initial situations’ equilibrium.   
  and    in 
the graph on the top are equilibrium price and quantity for the sender’s import 
market while   
  and    in the graph at the bottom are equilibrium price and 
quantity for the target’s export market. This illustrates that with partial embargoes’ 
enforcement, the situation breaks up with free trade situation. However, in terms 
of net social welfare, it is still better than the autarky situation that would be 
obtained by a total embargo’s imposition. 
2.1.1.2 Effects on an Import Embargo 
A restriction of the imports coming from the sender country intends to diminish 
the target’s financial ability to purchase goods by reducing its income via a 
diminution of its gains from trade (Davis and Engerman, 2003, pp.190-191).
 26
 
We present here the effects of an import quota. Figure 3 shows the effects of 
import sanctions. We assume that if import sanctions are enforced by a sender 
country, it will diminish the target’s exports demanded amount. Indeed, this type 
of sanctions prevents the sender domestic economy to import as much as before 
from the target country.  
Under free trade, target’s consumer purchases the amount    at price   . 
Producer supplies    and the difference between    and    constitutes the 
amount exported by the target domestic economy. Now assume that the partial 
embargo is imposed. The import embargo is meant to restrict specific imports 
such as oil from Iraq or Iran or all imports from a targeted country such as Cuban 
goods, tourism and so on. We assume that the sender country imposes an import 
quota corresponding to the dark vertical line against the target country. It reduces 
worldwide demand for the same amount, resulting in a shift in the quantity 
demanded from    to     . As the target’s export market mirrors the sender’s 
import market, quantity supplied in the target corresponds to     now. Figure 3 
presents the effects of import sanctions. As a consequence, this import quota has 
two effects. First, it restricts the possible exportable amount of goods in the target. 
In addition, the price in the target country decreases up to   , the price 
                                                 
26
 Moreover, in reality, it will more or less intensively benefit its competitors by eliminating a part 
of the competition on the world market, the target’s competition, depending upon its market share. 
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corresponding to the maximal saleable quantity    . Price    is lower than   , 
the price under free trade. As a result, its exports’ sales diminish, reducing its 
revenues. Effectively, the amount exported after the sanction’s imposition equals 
          whereas it was equal to         prior to the quota (      
             ). 
Figure 3 Import Sanctions Effects.  
 
 
Source: Eyler (2007), p.15. 
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Second, on the sender side, the price rises from    to   , reducing its market 
shortage from         to          . At this price, sender’s producers supply 
more whereas sender’s consumers will see their consumption constrained to    .  
On the sender’s side, consumer surplus diminishes, losing the area  . This area is 
transferred to sender’s producers. We notice that even in the case of an import 
embargo, sender’s consumers are better off than in the autarky’s case. However, 
we also notice that the sender country, in fixing an import quota, has to do a trade-
off between quota’s effects of the target and its domestic induced effects. Indeed, 
areas     to   correspond to the sender’s net welfare reduction induced by 
sanctions. If the import quota restricts all imports coming from the target country, 
the situation will be analytically comparable to the administration of a total 
embargo and lead to the autarky’s equilibrium (Ekengard, 2006, pp.10-11). As 
regards to consumer and producer surplus in the target country, consumer gains 
the area  , which is a part of the losses of the producers. In addition to area  , 
producers loss areas     and  . These three last areas represent the net welfare 
loss of the target. 
2.1.1.3 Conclusions 
First, we saw in the initial situation that countries benefit from free trade as 
international economics theories suppose. Both sender and target countries 
increases their economic social welfare. Second, both target and sender countries 
are worse off in case of embargoes than under free trade. Their total economic 
social welfare reduces. Under an export embargo, target consumers face higher 
prices for lower quantities. Indeed, their maximum consumable amount is 
constrained by the export embargo. Sender producers face lower prices for the 
maximum allowed supplied quantity. Under the import embargo, the situation 
reverses and target producers face lower prices for lower quantities while sender 
consumers face higher prices corresponding to a lower constrained quantity. The 
price differential between the world price and the domestic price corresponds to 
the rent. Third, partial embargoes where the maximum importable/exportable 
quantity implies a maximum possible demanded/supplied quantity lying between 
  , the quantity under autarky, and    or    reached under free trade, provoke 
less welfare losses than a total embargo in which countries return in autarky 
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situations. However, it is important to notice that the closer the quota moves to the 
amount corresponding to the autarky’s quantity equilibrium of the target,   , the 
higher will be the social welfare’s losses of the target. Lastly, the good’s elasticity 
of demand in the target country and the quantity fixed by the export embargo are 
the two factors that will dictate how much target welfare is finally lost. The exact 
price change is determined by the price-elasticity of the restricted good (Mitra and 
Josling, 2009, p.8). 
2.1.2 An Offer Curves Analysis 
Let us now turn to an offer curves modeling system presented by Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (2007). This model is helpful in analyzing the effects of trade 
sanctions on relative prices of imports and exports. Offer curves, also called 
reciprocal demand curves, express the level of trade of imports for exports that 
some state would like to purchase at different prices. Offers curves modeling 
system allows us not only to show the impact on the terms of trade of the 
implementation of sanctions but also to make inferences about the welfare effects 
of sanctions (general equilibrium context). 
Figure 4 presents international trade equilibria with sanctions. In Figure 4, the 
initial offer curve equilibrium is obtained at the intersection of curves   and . 
Curve   represents the potential targeted country by multilateral economic 
sanctions while the curve  represents its current trade partners that are all other 
countries in the world. Amounts of the export good of country  ,   , are 
measured on the horizontal axis whereas quantities of target’s   import good,  , 
are expressed on the vertical axis. As Kaempfer and Lowenberg explain, “any 
point along T’s offer curve shows some specific international trade equilibrium 
for country T, which is a welfare maximizing quantity of imports that would be 
acquired at the cost of a certain quantity of exports at some specific price ratio. 
That price ratio, or the terms of trade, is merely the ratio of exports to imports as 
represented by the slope of a ray from the origin to a point on the offer curve. In 
general, as country T moves out from the origin along its offer curve it is able to 
buy more imports for a lower cost in terms of exports per import, i.e., its terms of 
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trade improve, movement from the origin along a country’s offer curve is welfare 
enhancing for that country.”  (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.872). 
Figure 4 International Trade Equilibria with Sanctions. 
 
Source: Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007), p.873. 
Let turn to curve  now. This curve is the composite offer curve for all other 
countries, i.e. the rest of the world. It represents all world trade, net of the trade of 
the target state. As a result, the rest of the world exports the good that the target 
state imports corresponding to the good on the vertical axis          . 
Inversely, the rest of the world imports the export good of the target state, good 
          illustrated on the horizontal axis. We assume that the target state 
owes a worldwide comparative advantage in the good on the horizontal axis,   . 
It means that the targeted state, at least at the beginning, is the lonely supplier of 
   on the world market, and the rest of the world is a potential importer of this 
good and exporter of the other good,   .   and   curves’ intersection,  , 
represents the international trade equilibrium in the two-good offer curve model. 
At the intersection, the given terms of trade,   , equate supply and demand, i.e., 
exports and imports, in the world market for both goods. 
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2.1.2.1 Situation of Multilateral Sanctions 
Suppose now, that the rest of the world, , implements multilateral sanctions 
against a target country  . We assume that the sanction used is a total embargo on 
trade between  and  . This assumption simplifies at most the analysis. Such an 
embargo cancels the opportunity for trade between the rest of the world, , and 
the target state,  . As a consequence,   goes from the equilibrium  , a situation of 
international trade, to the origin,  , a situation of autarky. This worsens the terms 
of trade of   going from    to   . Moreover, this model not only shows the effects 
on the target state but also on the rest of the world that is the sender coalition. 
Thus, by implementing a total embargo against its trading partner  , the sender 
coalition is also imposing autarky conditions on itself, vis-à-vis  . This leads to a 
deterioration of its terms of trade, going from    to   . Indeed, the shift in its terms 
of trade represents an increase in the price of its net importable goods. For the 
target, the opposite phenomenon occurs. The shift in its terms of trade reduces the 
price of its net exportable goods. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that within 
the sender coalition, there will be considerable differences in the extent to which 
countries of the coalition individually suffer. Effectively, certain states members 
of the coalition might become net exporters of the goods previously imported 
from the target state, benefiting from the imposition of the sanction. As a result, 
the global terms of trade of   will decrease while the heterogeneous 
redistribution within the coalition will imply better terms of trade, respective 
worse terms of trade, for countries members of this coalition. Lastly, it is 
important to notice that this model consider   sender coalition countries acting as 
a unit without any free rider. In real world, this is usually not the case. 
The terms of trade change in a given situation is determined by the amount of 
curvature in the offer curves. The latter is a function of the price-elasticity of the 
offer to trade and the size of the trading countries. Indeed, “very large countries 
are self-sufficient enough to not reap very substantial gains from trade, but 
conversely they do not suffer extensively from abstaining from trade, following 
sanctions. Thus, large-country offer curves have very little curvature, almost 
resembling linear rays from the origin. Small countries, however, tend to be much 
more dependent on trade. Their demands and supplies of trading goods are price-
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inelastic and these countries can suffer greatly from the imposition of sanctions. 
Thus, small countries tend to have much more curvature in their offer curves than 
do large countries.” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.874). This element helps 
us to understand the reason why in real-life cases, most cases involved great 
sender countries against small economies. Moreover, this model considers trade in 
general. However, certain types of goods, for instance high-technology goods, are 
price-inelastic goods provoking higher effects on both actors involved in the 
sanctioning process. 
2.1.2.2 Situation of Unilateral Sanctions 
Consider now a situation of unilateral sanctions. First, we analyze the implications 
of a situation where a single sanctioning country,  , implements sanctions against 
a target country. As a result, in Figure 4, the rest of the world’s offer curve is 
reduced by the corresponding sanctioning country’s offer at each terms of trade 
and is now  . Moreover, the residual offer curve’s elasticity is also diminished by 
the sanctioning country’s withdrawal what implies that the new offer curve,  , 
must have a greater degree of curvature than the initial offer curve, .
27
 Because 
just one sender country implements sanctions against the target country, the latter 
is not reduced to autarky as in the case of multilateral sanctions. Indeed, it has 
always the opportunity to continue trading with non-sanctioning countries. 
Naturally, in the situation with one sanctioning country,  , target’s terms of trade, 
  , is worsened in comparison with the initial international trade equilibrium,   . 
More precisely, trade elasticites and the extent of the shift from  to   determine 
the degree of deterioration in the terms of trade of the target country. The greater 
bilateral pre-sanctions trade between the target and the sender country (or 
coalition), or the larger the number of sender countries relative to non-sanctioning 
countries, the larger is the extent of the shift from  to  . As the number of 
sender countries rises, we move from the unilateral case to the multilateral case, 
the terms of trade going from    to   , the latter corresponding to the extreme case 
                                                 
27
 The rest of the world offer curve is obtained by adding the import and export totals for all 
countries minus the target country along each ray. When the sender country’s offer curve is 
withdrawn from the rest of the world offer curve, the resulting residual offer curve lies closer to 
the origin at each terms of trade and is less price-elastic. 
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of autarky. Moreover, as Kaempfer and Lowenberg write, “the less elastic is the 
rest-of-the-world offer curve, R, the greater the extent of the deterioration of the 
target’s terms of trade.” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.874). At last, the 
terms of trade’s deterioration of the target is also greater the more inelastic the 
target’s offer curve (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.874). 
Second, looking at the effects of the unilateral sanctioning process on the sender 
country itself, we see that the results are the same as in the case of multilateral 
sanctioning. The sanction implementation implies the elimination of an 
inexpensive source of imports for the sender country,  . Moreover, in the extreme 
case where the sender country would have no alternative market among the rest of 
the world, the latter would end in a situation of autarky. As a result, the sender 
country, unable to get its desired import, finds itself far worse off following the 
imposition of sanctions than does the target, which still has the opportunity to 
trade with the rest of the world at worsened terms of trade. This result assumes no 
transshipment of target’s imports or exports through third non-sanctioning 
countries. Moreover, whether the goods exchanged among these states were all 
perfectly fungible, then the embargo would have almost any impact. Only higher 
transaction costs due to transshipment would appear. In addition, if both the 
sender and target countries were members of larger groups of countries, such as 
trade blocs, which are active on either side of the market, then the sanctions would 
not interfere with either country’s ability to engage in trade. Lastly, Harkness 
(1990) analyzes the case of partial sanctions that affect just a part of trade flows 
between sender and target countries. He shows that the impact of such sanctions 
on the sender country terms of trade and trade balance depend on the elasticities 
of demand for its imports and exports (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.875). 
2.1.2.3 Conclusions 
To sum up, as the trade model outlined in Figure 4, both sender and target 
countries are made worse off by trade embargoes. As Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
describe, “the degree to which the sanctions impose costs on these nations 
depends on the number and size of other countries willing to continue trading and 
on the elasticities of the trade offers of those countries.” (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 2007, p.875). The more inelastic are offer curves, the more dependent 
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on bilateral trade are actors involved. The imposition of an embargo, total or 
partial, will have a higher impact on the terms of trade of small economies 
specialized in what they export. Lastly, multilateral sanctions involve a greater 
deterioration in the target’s terms of trade than unilateral ones.  
Any distortion of prices of traded goods induced by sanctions ineluctably creates 
opportunities for third countries not members of the sanctioning coalition, 
transshippers and smugglers to capture rents by carrying on trade with the target 
country. Indeed, they purchase target’s exports below the world price and they sell 
target’s imports above the world price. The extent of the rents and, thus, the 
incentive to enter into sanctions-busting activities, increases with the severity of 
the sanctions as expressed in their terms-of-trade effects and is, therefore, greater 
in situation of multilateral sanctions than unilateral sanctions. Under unilateral 
sanctions, most of the rents go to traders in non-sanctioning countries. Under 
multilateral sanctions, traders from the target country itself engage in sanctions-
busting activity. Whether target’s rulers are able to enter into sanction-busting 
activities, they will benefit from rents and enrich themselves. 
2.2 The Domestic Decision of Implementation of an 
Embargo: the Game of Interest Groups 
The sanctioning behavior can be analyzed from two standpoints: the interest 
group theory and the single-rational actor methodology. These two concepts are 
not inevitably inconsistent with each other. Rather, they focus on different 
questions. According to the interest group theory, observed policies in 
international relations and their implications are perceived as outcomes of the set-
ups of domestic interest group politics within sender and target countries. In other 
words, it expresses how national policy choices mirror the interests of 
constituency groups within the polity. In this approach, embargo’s objective and 
more generally sanctions’ objective is to serve the interests of pressure groups 
within the sender country. National governments have no independent policy 
preferences or agendas. They are considered as arbiters of competing domestic 
interest groups, acting in a more or less impartial manner. While some pressure 
groups might derive pecuniary benefits (income effects) from the implementation 
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of economic sanctions, others get utility directly from taking a moral stance 
against some other country’s deviant policy. The first situation is expressed as the 
instrumental motive while the second case is well-known as the expressive motive 
developed by Per Lundborg (1987) and Johan Galtung (1959) (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1988, p.786). 
The public choice approach is based on the fact that policy markets exist, where 
the policy constitutes the good. Both sender and target states owe such markets. 
Interest groups play a decisive role in national policy decisions by putting 
pressure on politicians. They seek maximum net gain from policy as every citizen. 
The relative effectiveness of the interest groups in producing political pressure 
leads to the public policy outcomes. These pressures are the results of private 
utility maximization from individual members of interest groups involved. Even if 
these groups are defined by commonality of interests, each member of the group 
sees its political participation tempered by a propensity to free ride. Effectively, 
policies are public goods (Eyler, 2007, p.62 and Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988, 
pp.786-787).  
The basic narrative says that the government of the sender country supplies 
economic statecraft for an amount greater than zero. This is due to the fact that the 
sender country’s interest groups demand sanctions, bidding up what they are 
willing to pay. On the one hand, the price reflects the cost of engaging the 
government to take action. On the other hand, the quantity constitutes the level of 
action that the government is willing to undertake. Target countries face the same 
policy market. However, as the target government supplies deviant policy that it 
knows, will spark off economic sanctions as a reaction, it engages in that policy 
with an expected cost. This expected cost is an imported cost that needs to be 
added to the domestically produced policy cost resulting of supplying the deviant 
policy. Once sanctions are initiated, sanctions pursue if both states’ policy market 
clear at a nonzero quantity of actions. 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) are two famous scholars who contributed to the 
study of economic sanctions by elaborating public choice models. In their model, 
they analyze sender agents that have specific interests in initiating economic 
sanctions. “Utility is assumed to be maximized by agents of both economies, 
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where it is based on an agent’s income.” (Eyler, 2007, p.65). Using an equilibrium 
model of interest group competition, they explain how public policy outcomes are 
a function of the relative effectiveness of interest groups in producing political 
pressure. 
2.2.1 The Game of Interest Groups in the Sender 
Country 
Kampfer and Lowenberg (1988) explain that the level of economic sanctions is 
the result of pressures of different objective-oriented interest groups in the 
political system. These pressures result from private utility maximization of 
individual members of the interest groups implied. These interest groups are led 
by commonality of interests although each member’s participation is tempered by 
a desire to free ride. 
Consider some individual   a member of the population   of some state. His utility 
is maximized according to 
        (  )   
       
    
Subject to                                      
       
     
( 1) 
Where   denotes the income,   is an initial endowment and   is a nonnegative, 
continuous variable measuring the level of sanctions implemented against some 
target country. 
The following assumptions are made: 
(H1) The polity of both sender and target countries is compounded of two primary 
interest groups   and  . 
(H2) Sanctions increase or decrease individual income at a fixed rate as sanctions 
constitute interventions that provoke distortions, ∑   
    . Sanctions increase the 
income of specific interest groups at the expense of others. Moreover, they are 
inefficient. 
(H3) There are no output deadweight losses induced by sanctions,   ∑   
     . 
(H4) The marginal utilities of all individuals in the neighborhood of     are 
similar. Thus, for an infinitesimally small level of sanctions, since the income 
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gain of group   is assumed exactly equal to the loss of group   (H1), it follows 
that the willingness to pay of group   for more sanctions is equal to the 
willingness to pay of group   for fewer sanctions. Therefore, the political market 
clears at          . 
The change in utility provoked by a modification of the level of sanction is 
     ⁄     
    
    
( 2) 
Let   {     }  such that for all              respectively,   
      
  
    
   . Doing so, we can specify separate demand functions for sanctions as 
certain group benefit from sanctions while others suffer from their imposition. For 
the group  , benefiting from sanctions, all members’ willingness to pay for more 
sanctions can be summed to get 
    
     ∑     ⁄  ∑  
    
    
    
  
 
(3) 
where    is the unit price of sanctions. This represents the dollar amount that 
members of group   are willing to pay to get a given level of utility-enhancing 
sanctions through the political market. This demand curve follows a downward 
sloping because of specification made in equation ( 1). 
In regard to the individuals of group  , they are willing to pay to avoid sanctions 
as they suffer from them. Their demands reflect a demand for reduced sanctions 
which is, when exposed as a function of an increasing level of sanctions 
    
      ∑     ⁄  
 
 ∑  
    
      
    
 
 
(4) 
The previous two demand functions express the maximum willingness to pay of 
individuals of groups  and  . Nevertheless, individuals have an incentive to 
reveal a lower willingness to pay in order to free ride on other interest group 
individuals. The political effectiveness of a certain interest group determines the 
extent to which this capacity to free ride reduces its demand. As a result, demands 
need to be adapted as follow 
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(5) 
        
              
(6) 
Where    and    denote shift parameters expressing the degrees of free riding in 
groups   and   which define the capacities of the two groups to generate political 
influence. The magnitude of     and    increases with the severity of the free 
rider problem. Indeed, as Kaempfer and Lowenberg note on the base of Buchanan 
and Tullock work (1962), “free riding is a function of the size of the group and 
other factors which influence organization and enforcement costs.” (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1988, p.788). 
Figure 5 describes the political market for sanctions. The political market 
equilibrium is obtained by equating the demand for more sanctions (3) and (5) 
with the demand for less sanctions (4) and (6). The government increases the level 
of sanctions until the pressure for fewer sanctions offsets pressure for more 
sanctions. Figure 5 shows such a political market for sanctions. 
Figure 5 Political Market for Sanctions. 
 
Source: Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), p.788. 
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In the presence of deadweight costs (relaxing assumption H3) and in the case of 
administrative costs, an equilibrium would appear for a negative level of sanctions 
(excluded by the assumption of non-negativity of   ). 
In respect for the political effectiveness of respective interest groups, whether it 
was identical for all interest groups, no sanction would be implemented by the 
government. Effectively, as Gary Becker stated (1985), “…no policy that lowered 
social output would survive if all groups were equally large and skillful at 
producing political influence…” (Becker, 1985, p.344; in Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1988, p.789). Nevertheless, because of the free riding problem, it 
decreases the political effectiveness of respective groups, demand curves move 
below    and   . Assuming that   is a small group, each individual within this 
group benefits from a significant part of the increased income induced by an 
increase in sanctions. This makes   much more politically effective than  , 
       , implying a smaller shift of      below    than      under    in 
Figure 5. 
Moreover, a second element influences utility: sanctions. Consider sanctions as a 
public good that directly benefits, respectively diminishes, individual utility 
through its symbolic effect. The new specified utility function is given by 
            
(7) 
A direct and an indirect effect on utility is obtained by differentiating the above 
utility function with respect to   
     ⁄       |     ⁄    
    
   
(8) 
Assuming that the direct effect,      |     ⁄  is positive, group  ’s pressure will 
increase, moving their demand for sanctions to    in Figure 5. Whereas group   
lowers its income because of sanctions, the latter increases the direct utility of 
members of the group. As a result, group  ’s demand curve shifts to   . Finally, 
all individual part of   get a positive utility from the imposition of sanctions and 
so the level of sanctions increases to   . Nevertheless, sanctions could imply 
greater utility for certain members while they would reduce the utility of other 
members. Assuming a third interest group is being constituted of such 
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benefiting/suffering individuals, political strategies and alliances would occur 
between groups   and   and parts of members of group  . At the end, the level of 
sanctions of the market would depend on the relative intensities of preference and 
political inefficiencies in the pro- and anti-sanctions parts of  . 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1992) found out that the entire political struggle for 
sanctions implementation will be won by agents earning marginal income greater 
than zero. This group of agents will pressure the government to pursue its 
sanctions as long as it derives benefits from the sanctioning process and asks to 
cease its sanctions as soon as gains will disappear. Other authors argue that 
interest groups ask for sanctions because they will gain a large part of policy’s 
wealth gains resulting from the sanctions, in a similar way to trade barriers. Lastly, 
in terms of trade, Bonetti writes that: “[…] the incentive to devote resources to 
lobbying against trade sanctions will be greater the larger is the trade linkage. This 
in turn means the larger the trade linkage the greater are the domestic political 
costs of imposing trade sanctions.” (Bonetti, 1997, p.729; in Eyler, 2007, pp.65-
66). Therefore, the public choice approach expects an inverse relationship 
between the pre-sanction trade linkage and the likelihood of implementing trade 
sanctions. 
2.2.2 The Game of Interest Groups in the Target 
Country 
The model used in this section is similar to the one developed above, except that 
the endogenous policy outcome is the level of policy package   , which is judged 
as  a deviant policy by sender country’s interest groups, instead of the level of 
sanctions. This policy package is income decreasing. 
Again, we assume that population   have two main interest groups:   and   for 
which the income increases, respectively decreases, with higher levels of  . 
Likewise, group   is still assumed to be more effective for politically pressuring 
the government than group  . Equations ( 1) to (4) describe the political market-
clearing mechanism in the target country for the deviant policy   (instead of  ) in 
Figure 6. At the equilibrium, the optimal policy outcome will be   . 
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Now, assume that economic sanctions implemented by the sender country 
decrease income for individuals of both interest groups. The individual budget 
constraint is now given by 
             
      
     
(9) 
Utility is decreased indirectly by sanctions via their negative impact on income 
     ⁄    
    
     
(10) 
Moreover, we assume that economic sanctions are a determinant of the political 
ineffectiveness of groups   and   
           
     
                 
(11) 
This latter expression captures the different individuals’ perceptions of the signal 
sent by sanctions. Partisans of the target government, individuals of a group  , 
might perceive economic sanctions as an interference with target national 
sovereignty. In this perspective, they will “rally around the flag” and increase 
resources devoted to the policy package   (  
   ). But, if the income-reducing 
consequences of sanctions discourage them, their incentive to free ride in the 
production of pro-   pressure will rise (   
   ). For the opposition group, 
sanctions might indicate a signal of foreign support for their struggle against the 
deviant policy. Thus, members of group   will be less tempted to free ride and 
become more efficient in producing political pressure (  
   ). 
Figure 6 illustrates the possible consequences of sanctions on the optimal level of 
deviant policy package  . Demand functions   
 
 and   
  reflect income effects of 
sanctions. Both interest groups are confronted to a decrease in income that lowers 
their respective willingness to pay for     or against     policy package  . The 
relative shift’s magnitudes in both demand curves will determine the new policy 
equilibrium,   . In Figure 6, the level of the deviant policy rests unchanged. 
As Kaempfer and Lowenberg denote, “if sanctions signal the support of foreigners 
for the struggle against  , the parameter    will decrease and the demand 
schedule of group  will shift up to   
 , leading to a fall in    to   
 . As Gordon 
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Tullock (1971) has pointed out, anything which increases the probability of 
successful political resistance or lowers the expected costs to individuals of 
political participation will lead to an increase in resistance activities.” (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1988, p.791). This foreign signal resulting from sanctions should 
diminish incentive to free ride for the opponent interest group  . Deepening this 
reflection, whether sanctions are implemented incrementally, holding out the 
threat of further sanctions, members of group   will be discouraged and more 
entailed to free ride. As a result,    will rise, leading demand curve   
 
 to move 
downward and resulting in a lower outcome,   
 . 
Figure 6 Possible Effects of Sanctions on the Optimal Level of Deviant Policy 
Package A. 
 
Source: Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), p.791. 
Lastly, only sanctions that affect differently partisans and opponents of   are able 
to induce policy change in the target country. Indeed, as we saw before, even a 
large negative income impact, which would result in a downward shift, would not 
change the policy outcome if both interest groups were hurt with the same 
proportion. Kaempfer and Lowenberg conclude that the sanctioning strategy 
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should be developed according to its signal and threat consequences rather than 
just its straightforward income impact. 
2.2.3 Conclusions 
To conclude, the actual level of economic sanctions results from the composition 
of interest groups and their respective political effectiveness. If interest groups all 
had the same political effectiveness, no economic sanction would be enforced. 
Economic sanctions take the form of trade restrictions that reduce wealth in 
aggregate but are redistributional in nature. Economic sanctions reduce income in 
the sender country but do not necessarily imply that they will induce the 
maximum economic damage in the target country. Interest groups within the 
target country struggle for a deviant policy package. This deviant policy will be 
the object of sanctions. Only economic sanctions that affect differently partisans 
and opponents of the policy package will be able to induce policy change. For this 
reason, economic sanctions should be developed according to their signal and 
threat consequences. As a result, this model supports the smart sanctions strategy. 
2.3 Sanctioning Process and Formation of a Coalition 
of Sender Countries 
In the single-rational actor methodology, the relevant unit of analysis is the state. 
Indeed, this standpoint considers that states are the prime players on the 
international stage. The aim of this methodology is to explain how one state’s 
international policy decisions both influence and are influenced by other states’ 
decisions. Governments decide about whether and how to apply sanctions and 
whether to comply with or resist sanctions. The sanctions’ objective is to 
engender policy change in the target state through inflicting the severest possible 
economic harm. These decisions are ordinarily strategic and that is the reason why 
game theory is often used for analyzing states’ behaviors (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 2007, pp.889-90). 
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2.3.1 The Sender-Target Relationship: Why the 
Coalition of Countries Implement Sanctions? 
Economic sanctions work like wars of attrition (Eyler, 2007, p.35). The sender 
country tries to influence the target country’s income and wealth so that the target 
country complies and gives up its initial contradictory policy. Once embargoes are 
used, costs accrue for both, sender and target states, what diminishes the benefits 
of respective policies: the sender’s state economic statecraft and the deviant policy 
behavior of the target state. Effectively, the imposition of sanctions constitutes a 
deadweight loss of utility for all members of a sanction’s episode because of the 
disrupted economic exchange they imply. This provides the sender and target 
countries an incentive to reach an agreement before the imposition of economic 
sanctions. In a situation where the sender country prefers the status quo to the use 
of economic sanctions, then there should be no coercion attempt. On the other 
hand, whether the target country prefers conceding to risking the costs of 
economic sanctions, it has an incentive to comply before the initiation of 
economic sanctions. At this stage, there would have no sanction’s episode, only 
the threat of imposing sanctions would have been dissuasive (Drezner, 2003, 
p.644 and Eyler, 2007, p.35).   
As Drezner explains, a “basic narrative”, that follows, is common to most theories 
and modeling of coercion: “the sender threatens to interrupt the status quo and 
block a stream of economic exchange with the target unless the sanctioned 
country acquiesces to a specific demand made by the sender. If the target 
complies, sanctions are not imposed. If the target stands firm, the sender faces a 
choice between backing down or carrying out its threat and imposing sanctions.” 
(Drezner, 2003, p.645). 
Game-theoretic models of coercion in which the sender and target states are 
supposed to be rational unitary actors, seeking individual benefit maximization 
through their actions, conclude on a common prediction: successful examples of 
economic coercion have a high likelihood to end at the threat stage than at the 
initiation stage. This intuition comes from the economic literature on bargaining 
(Rubinstein 1982). Indeed, deadweight costs are linked with the sanctions’ 
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initiation and they never occur for both the sender and target states if they 
conclude an agreement before the initiation of the sanctions. For rational utility 
maximizers, this option constitutes a more efficient solution. Finally, under 
assumptions of full information, rational utility maximizers and perfectly divisible 
demands, only two equilibrium outcomes appear: either the sender country 
abandons the threat of coercion or the target country agrees on the sender’s threat 
of coercion. As a result, in this situation, economic sanctions should never be 
implemented (Drezner, 2003, pp.645-646). Figure 7 presents a model of economic 
coercion. 
Figure 7 A Model of Economic Coercion. 
 
Source: Drezner (2003), p.646. 
Nevertheless, in reality, economic sanctions are relatively frequently used. 
Reasons for their initiation can be found in explanations for why rational, unitary 
actors go to war (use of force) rather than achieve an incentive-compatible 
bargaining before the use of force. James Fearon (1995) presents three foreseeable 
explanations: “(1) private information about an actor’s resolve combined with an 
incentive to misrepresent such information, (2) an inability for one or both states 
to credibly commit to mutually preferable bargains, and (3) a disputed issue that is 
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inherently indivisible.” (Drezner, 2003, p.646). Models explaining economic 
sanctions’ imposition are based on these three foreseeable explanations, 
combining them in different manners. Instead of presenting a specific model here, 
part of the literature on model coercion is reviewed below. 
First, Drezner (1998, 1999) explains how the implementation of economic 
sanctions combines issue indivisibility and the inability to commit credibly. His 
model assumes complete information and that the target county “will make 
concessions if the sender prefers a deadlock outcome of sanctions imposition to 
backing down.” (Drezner, 2003, p.647). Both countries incorporate expectations 
of future conflict and short-run opportunity costs of economic coercion into their 
decisions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.890). According to Drezner, 
sanctions enforcement can become an equilibrium outcome if the following 
conditions are met: the demand is indivisible and expectations of future conflict 
are high. Indeed, under the second condition, both sender and target countries 
“fear that any concessions made in the present will leave them in a weakened 
bargaining position in future conflicts, making credible commitments more 
difficult to achieve.” (Drezner, 2003, p.647). As a result, sender countries expect 
that frequent conflicts with the target country are more inclined to enforce 
sanctions than countries expecting fewer future conflicts, while target countries 
anticipate to be in conflict with the sender country in the future are less likely to 
comply with the sender country’s demands (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, 
p.890). The model foretells that when sanctions occur, the outcome is a sustained 
deadlock between the sender and target countries. In case of concessions, the 
game would end at the threat stage. 
Second, three models combine imperfect information and issue indivisibility. 
Morgan and Miers (1999) and Smith (1996) propose models with one-sided 
incomplete information and get similar empirical predictions. “In both models, the 
sender does not know whether the target prefers to stand firm or prefers to 
acquiesce to the sender’s demands rather than suffer the cost of sanctions.” 
(Drezner, 2003, p.647). Morgan and Miers use a discrete one-shot game whereas 
Smith adopts a continuous time modeling. For Morgan and Miers, sanctions 
implementation can result from “the sender’s lack of information about the 
  
57 
target’s resolve, and the target’s incentive to signal a high degree of resolve 
(…).”(Drezner, 2003, p.647). Likewise, Smith predicts that the target would only 
concede at the threat stage, if conceding at all. In regards to Lacy and Niou’s 
model (2000, 2004), incomplete information is assumed to affect both sides. 
Again, indivisibility constitutes the second assumption. Anew, Lacy and Niou get 
similar conclusions.  
To conclude, all four models explain the imposition of sanctions providing 
various explanations but all conclude that “a target that prefers conceding to 
deadlock and believes that the sender will carry out its threat will acquiesce before 
imposition to avoid incurring the costs of sanctions.” (Drezner, 2003, p.648). 
Lastly, based on a similar game structure, these four models all empirically 
predict that “sanctions should yield more concessions at the threat stage than at 
the implementation stage.” (Drezner, 2003, p.648). The robustness of this 
prediction among the different information’s distribution is striking. 
Other famous game-theoretic models are those of Eaton and Engers (1992, 1999). 
The authors use a theory of bargaining under incomplete information. They 
demonstrate that “success is more likely when the cost of a threatened sanction to 
the sender country is low relative to the gain to the sender from changing the 
target’s behavior, while the cost of the sanction to the target is high relative to the 
costs to the target of complying with the sanctioner’s demands.” (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 2007, pp.890-891). They found out that in a world of perfect 
information, economic sanctions would never be imposed. Indeed, whether a 
threatened sanction was sufficiently effective, the targeted country would 
acquiesce to the sender’s demands, whether the sanction was not effective, the 
sanctioner would not threaten it. Therefore, the fact that economic sanctions are 
enforced results from two possible situations: either the sender country 
underestimated the target’s costs of compliance or the target country 
underestimated the sender country’s resolve. In the first situation, the sanctions 
fail whereas in the second situation they succeed. 
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2.3.2 The Formation of a Coalition between Sender 
Countries: What tell us Game Theory? 
The previous subchapter concentrated on the sanction’s imposition process 
assuming that the sender country was acting alone or that the coalition of senders 
would have acted as a unitary actor without any free rider. Let us turn to the 
particular sender-sender relationship now. 
During their economic sanctions’ study, analysts noticed the importance of 
acquiring international cooperation if sanctions are to work. Indeed, countries 
planning to use export sanctions seldom have unilateral control over the products 
they want to forbid the target country from having. As well, concerning import 
sanctions, only a monopsonist would be capable to deny a market to the target 
country without international cooperation. Unilateral economic sanctions may 
make the target country to bear some transition costs because of the search of new 
trading partners. Likewise, the target may have to purchase its imports at higher 
prices or sell its exports at lower prices. Unless countries reach a significant level 
of international cooperation, natural market forces tend to make these effects 
temporary and relatively small in size (Martin, 1993, p.408). 
Multilateralism, according to Ruggie’s definition (1992) and quoted by Martin, 
“requires that states sacrifice substantial levels of flexibility in decision making 
and resist short-term temptation in favor of long-term benefits.” (Martin, 1992, 
p.768). Effectively, international cooperation is often described as a product of 
national self-interest in an increasingly interdependent world. Stable cooperation 
depends on the following elements: perceptions of interdependence, the ability to 
monitor and react to other collaborating countries’ compliance, a long enough 
shadow of the future and reasonable differences in payoffs for cooperation and 
defection (Dittmeier, 2009, p.2). 
Multilateral economic sanctions are exposed to a collective action problem. 
Because benefits of certain cooperative efforts are public goods, such as security, 
there is an incentive to free ride. Thus, some nations will attempt to free ride, 
accruing the benefits of sanctions without suffering the costs of their 
implementation (Coase 1960 and Martin 1992). As Dittmeier (2009) rightly 
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explains, “multilateral sanctions are thus torn between two mutually-exclusive 
characteristics: the efficacy of universality and the inefficiency of large groups.” 
(Dittmeier, 2009, p.4). The important terms-of-trade distortion creates incentives 
for circumvention and noncooperation. Countries that defect from a sanctions 
regime or that do not cooperate on the sender side, benefit from arbitraging 
between the world price and the terms of trade resulting from the sanctions 
enforced against the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999, 44). 
In terms of games, four problems related to cooperation appear: coordination 
games, collaboration games, suasion games and assurance games. On the one 
hand, coordination and collaboration games assume symmetrical interest. On the 
other hand, suasion and assurance games share asymmetric interests. 
Table 2 Simple Four-category Typology of Cooperation Problems. 
Symmetrical interests Asymmetrical interests 
Coordination games Assurance games 
Collaboration games Suasion games 
 Source: Martin (1992), p.768. 
First, collaboration games describe a situation where states face “dilemmas of 
common interests”, the collective action problem. In this situation, states need to 
specify actions that they will undertake in order to get a specific outcome. The 
prisoners’ dilemma is a typical collaboration game. Defection in this type of game 
implies immediate payoffs. As a result, this sort of games involves strong 
incentives to defect and, therefore, an enforcement mechanism is required in order 
to maintain cooperation. More precisely, two elements in particular promote 
cooperation in collaboration games: information on other countries behavior, 
since undetected defection adds costs for those who keep cooperation and 
extensive monitoring and assessment of compliance from successful cases of 
collaboration games. Countries will exchange information retrospectively. 
Moreover, the shadow of the future should be extended in order to assure that 
immediate costs resulting from cooperation would be offset by the long-term 
gains. As Martin (1992) explains, “the solution to collaboration problems in the 
absence of a state acting as an entrepreneur and in the presence of large numbers 
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of players requires centralization” such as formal organizations can provide 
(Martin, 1992, p.770). 
Second, coordination games describe situations where states face “dilemmas of 
common aversions”. Two typical examples are the chicken game and the battle of 
the sexes. This game has two possible outcomes and no dominant strategy exists. 
Therefore, the central dilemma is determining which of the two equilibria will 
predominate. As Martin (1992) comments, “the two players disagree on this and 
bargaining over the outcome might be quite intense, especially if players expect 
the result to hold far into the future. Coordination games can have major 
distributional implications, which sometimes make cooperative solutions difficult 
to achieve.” (Martin, 1992, p.775). Nevertheless, once equilibrium has been 
reached, none of the players has an incentive to defect. For this type of problem, it 
will be easier to reach a cooperation outcome if structures that facilitate 
bargaining and help state to identify a focal point are implemented. 
These two first types of problems assumed symmetry of interests. Let us turn now 
to the opposite situation, condition of asymmetry. Indeed, in real life, often states 
experience asymmetry of interests. Moreover, a hegemonic country, such as the 
United States, is willing to supply public goods on unilateral way because of its 
dominant strategy for cooperation. Therefore, in suasion game, small countries 
have a strong incentive to free ride. Indeed, they know that with or without their 
cooperation efforts, the public good will be provided. On the other hand, the 
hegemon prefer third country cooperation rather than the unilateral situation. 
Therefore, the hegemon country must convince or coerce other countries to 
cooperate. It has two options: threaten to act irrationally in the short run or use 
tactical issue linkage in forms of threats or promises. In the first case, a problem 
linked with credibility’s establishment appears. In the second case, the hegemon 
acts on other player’s payoff. By using threats, it may diminish the payoff 
resulting from unilateral defection of the smaller sender. At the opposite, by 
promising rewards (side payments for instance), the dominant sender increase the 
payoff linked with mutual cooperation. Again, in this situation, a credibility 
problem appears: applying threats or promises that are costly for the sender 
country. Often, the hegemon will decide to opt either for unilateral or multilateral 
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sanctions based on its discount rate. In other words, the longer the horizon, the 
more attractive multilateralism for the dominant state (Martin, 1992, pp.778-786). 
Lastly, the last game is an assurance game for which the lonely possible outcome 
is mutual cooperation. Indeed, under assumptions of rational states with complete 
information, states will cooperate. This equilibrium is Pareto-superior knowing 
that no additional gain can be obtained from defecting. 
2.3.3 Explaining the Sanction Busting Trade 
Phenomenon
28
 
Once sanctions are imposed against a target country, sanctions-busting trade’s 
opportunity appears. Sanction busting behavior is defined as “a significant 
increase in a third-party’s trade with the target following the imposition of 
sanctions, constituted in high enough levels so as to have a salient impact upon 
the economic costs the sanctions would otherwise impose.” (Early, 2009, p.50). In 
an operational point of view, two elements are primordial in determining it: a 
significant rise in bilateral trade between the third country and the target country 
and an absolute threshold for which the third country become a significantly 
important trade partner for the target. Sanctions-busting trade occurs in a model 
made up of three actors: the sender country, the target country and the third-party 
countries or so-called rest of the world. All these countries are connected together 
with interdependent relations as Figure 8 shows. States’ trade and conflict 
conducts might be influenced by these indirect connections whose characteristics 
determine how likely countries may become sanctions busters (Early, 2009, 
pp.51-52). 
  
                                                 
28
 This subchapter is inspired from Early’s article (2009). 
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Figure 8 States' Interdependent Relations Model. 
 
Source: Early (2009), p.52. 
Indeed, while the sender country attempts to forestall third-party countries from 
impeding the sanctioning process or even try to persuade them to join it, target 
countries endeavor to obtain third-party support in order to weaken the sanctions’ 
effects. Support is provided by either aid or trade. The response of third countries 
depends on their relations with both sender and target countries as well as 
economic constituencies. Effectively, economic constituencies in both third-party 
countries and even sender state are interested in entering potentially lucrative 
trade with the target state and its domestic companies. The aim of this subchapter 
is to review the two main paradigms explaining such sanctions-busting behaviors 
and empirical evidence based on Early’s findings. 
Two opposite theories, appearing from international relations’ field, attempt to 
explain sanctions-busting trade behavior: realism and liberalism. Realism and 
liberalism theories differ from each other regarding international trade. The core 
of the divergence is located in the assumptions formulated, more precisely in the 
“governments’ capacity to constraint theirs states’ trade flows and whether state 
trade behavior is driven primarily by security or profits.” (Early, 2009, p.50). 
Indeed, “realism argues that third-party states’ trade with sanctioned target states 
should reflect their state-based security concerns. In turn, liberalism contends that 
third-party states’ trade with the target is driven primarily by profit-seeking firms 
and individuals.” (Early, 2009, p.49).  
First, from the realist perspective, the world is constituted of unitary states, all 
members of an anarchical, self-help international framework. In this context, 
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states are continuously interested in the relative gains realized by potential rivals. 
Realists’ core concern of international trade is its consequences on security. 
Indeed, realists link together international trade and its potential positive 
externalities on national power. In the realist’s view, states trade in a strategic 
manner, trading in a greater extend with their allies and states sharing analogous 
interests than their rivals. Still in this view, some scholars have gone further 
explaining that the following dictums, “the enemy of my friend is my enemy” and 
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, can affect bilateral trade. The assumption 
postulating that governments lead the national trading behaviors, for both public 
and private sectors, constitutes the key element of this theory. As a result, realists 
go by third-party countries’ security ties with the sender and target countries in 
order to explain sanctions-busting behaviors (Early, 2009, p.52). 
Second, the liberal perspective is based on economic considerations of the parties 
involved in trade in order to explain sanctions-busting behavior. In the liberal 
perspective, individuals and private entities constitute the main actors in 
international politics. They are rational, risk averse actors that constitute prime 
determinants of trade flows. For liberalists, “international trade is thus explained 
by the profitability of trading opportunities available to individual firms and their 
capacity to capitalize on them.” (Early, 2009, p.54). Multilateral trade implies 
transaction costs, which increase with uncertainty. Therefore, rational companies 
led by profitability and notably constrained by uncertainty, need to express and 
continuously revise their expectations of future returns and adapt trade in 
consequence. Therefore, they are in a perpetual pursuit of economic opportunities, 
trying to identify and profit from them, while avoiding losses (Early, 2009, p.54). 
Both security interests and private sectors’ economic interests determine third-
party states’ responses. Indeed, Early found that “the highest probability of 
busting occurs when both the state’s security interests and economic interests 
align in favor of sanctions-busting.” (Early, 2009, p.65). However, the evidence 
provides strong support for the liberal perspective. Indeed, Early finds out the 
following counter-intuitive finding: “having a defense pact with the United States 
had a significant positive effect on third-party states’ general trade flows with 
sanctioned states.” (Early, 2009, p.65). This last result was also found by Yang 
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and al. (2004). Indeed, historically, the U.S. sanctions had significant, positive 
effects on Japanese and European Union trade with U.S. sanctioned countries. The 
realist perspective would explain this finding in contradicting its own theory. It 
would explain that countries, that run their indirect ties with other countries in an 
intricate manner, would break their alliance partners’ policy choices because of 
complex strategy of balancing. On the contrary, the liberal perspective provides 
much greater insight and explains that responses of the firms located within the 
sender, target and third-party countries need to be considered in order to figure out 
why a third-party defense pact with the sender country could help do sanction-
busting. Indeed, when the sender imposes sanctions on the target, sanctions will 
also have negative consequences on its own national firms. Domestic actors 
located in the sender state must give up the gains from trade with the target state 
because of the sender’s ban of exchange. Because of the substantial costs that a 
change in trading partners, going from the best to the second-best trading partner, 
would imply, companies within the sender country will be tempted to continue 
trading with their target country’s partners by looking for other means of doing so. 
One of these means comprises re-exportation. Companies within the sender state 
send their cargo via other states, often states with which they already have close 
relations, from where they will then re-export their cargo to the target state. 
Another way includes transferring their business to a third-party state from where 
they can continue to trade with the target state. At last, these alternatives represent 
the least expensive manner to continue exchanging with the target for the firms 
within the sender state. For instance, many U.S. commercial activities were re-
routed through proxies or relocated to Canada by U.S. companies as a result of the 
imposition of U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba (Early, 2009, p.66). Finally, 
Early’s study results related to the explanatory variable      reinforce this 
interpretation: “as the costs to the sender rise in imposing sanctions, so does the 
likelihood of sanctions-busting. The greater the economic disruption within the 
sender state, the larger the incentives are for their own firms to find other states in 
which or through which to continue trading with the target.” (Early, 2009, p.66). 
Early identifies several features that influence positively sanction busting trade 
behavior. He explains that certain third countries may capture a disproportionate 
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part of the potential gains to be realized in trading with the target due to the cross-
national disparity in political and economic factors between third countries. As a 
result, the size and trade openness of third countries matters. Effectively, it will be 
easier to absorb surplus exports coming from the target as well as adapt the 
production in order to meet the increased demand of the target for large third-
party economies.  Moreover, as economic sanctions generate transactions costs 
because of the uncertainty they imply, political and economic linkages that 
contribute to the improvement of transparency provide companies more 
confidence in bilateral trade with the target state. Social linkages, as for instance 
past colonial relationships, constitute a factor influencing positively bilateral trade, 
giving confidence to companies as regard the stability of those states’ relations. 
Lastly, another factor affecting bilateral trade is international trade’s share in the 
third country’s economy. As Early denotes, “the greater the extent to which 
international trade comprises a significant proportion of the economic and 
commercial activity of the third-party state, the larger the size and power of the 
commercial interests available to pressure the governments toward maintaining 
the openness of the state’s economy.” (Early, 2009, p.56). Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg and Bonetti demonstrated similar results. 
In conclusion, Early finds out that sender country’s closest allies are more likely 
to adopt sanction busting activities than its rivals. Liberalism, based on economic 
considerations of the parties involved in trade, provides an explanation for such a 
behavior. Moreover, factors that influence third country sanction busting trade 
behavior at most are third country GDP, trade openness and strong pre-existing 
commercial relationship with the target country. This result is not surprising and 
corresponds to what international trade theory predicts. 
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3 Empirical Evidence 
The last part of this work presents empirical studies on the effect of economic 
sanctions on trade from two basic research methods: econometric estimations and 
case studies. Generally, the aim of econometric studies is to estimate the impact 
(costs) of economic sanctions in terms of trade. For case studies, usually, the 
impact on the whole domestic targeted economy is observed. The case studies 
presented here are based on descriptive statistics. 
Chapter 3.1 presents results of econometric studies from Yang et al. (2004) and 
Slavov (2007). Chapter 3.2 describes results from two study cases. The first case 
study, taken from Losman (1974), introduces the effect of the embargo on Cuba. 
The second case study presents effects of economic sanctions against Iran. Torbat 
(2005) is the author of this second case study. 
3.1  What do Econometric Models predict? 
One famous study in economic sanctions, serving as pioneer in this area notably 
for their dataset and their econometric estimates, is the works of Hufbauer et al. 
(1997).
29
 Their many works serve as references in this field. Nevertheless, we will 
not present their results here but more recent econometrical studies led by Yang, 
Askari, Forrer and Teegen (2004) and Slavov (2007). The study of Yang et al. 
(2004) focuses on the impact of US economic sanctions on US trade with target 
countries and on third countries. Slavov (2007) analyzed the effects of UN 
sanctions on neighbor countries. These two studies should give us some insights 
of the effects of economic sanctions on trade between sender and target countries 
as well as on the effects on third-countries. 
The model used by the different authors is the gravity model. The gravity model is 
based on Newton’s theory of gravitation stating that the gravitational pull between 
two celestial bodies is positively related to the product of their masses and 
inversely related to their distance apart. Likewise, the gravity model, in its 
elementary form, predicts that the volume of bilateral trade between two countries 
                                                 
29
 Their first results were published in 1985. From this moment, they have published three editions 
of their book Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, in 1985, 1990; the last version being edited in 
2007. 
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will be positively related to the product of their outputs (GDP), and negatively 
related to the distance between them (commonly measured by the distance 
between the two capital cities). The reason is that countries with a greater 
economy tend to trade more in absolute terms, while geographical distance that 
constitutes a proxy for transportation costs should push down bilateral trade. 
Other explanatory variables and dummy variables such as the share of a common 
border or a common language, the membership in a trade bloc and so on can be 
added to the basic model. The use of dummy variables allows the authors to refine 
the analysis by specifying specific characteristics of the bilateral trade relationship 
that interest them. Lastly, this model is of particular use for the analysis of 
bilateral trade flows because of the empirically tractable framework that it 
provides (Yang et al., 2004, p.26). 
Now that the general framework is given, we will look in details at the results of 
the different works mentioned above. In a first phase, we will review the results 
obtained by Yang et al. (2004) on the impact of US economic sanctions on US 
trade with target countries and third countries. Then, we will present the study of 
Slavov (2007) which analyzes the impact of UN sanctions on neighbor countries. 
3.1.1 US Economic Sanctions’ Impact on US Trade with 
Target Countries and Third Countries 
Yang et al. (2004) have two objectives: study the impact of US economic 
sanctions on the sender country that is the United States (three dependent 
variables are analyzed: total bilateral trade calculated by adding exports and 
imports, exports and imports) and examine the third-country effects of US 
unilateral economic sanctions. Third countries selected by the authors are the 
European Union and Japan, owing to the fact that both represent alternate trading 
partners and main US competitors in many sectors. 
The basic gravity model used by Yang et al. (2004) estimates the following 
dependent variable: bilateral trade between country i and country j (        . 
This variable will finally result in three different measures: export from country I 
to country j, import in country i from country j and total trade between country i 
and country j. The model includes the following explanatory variables: the 
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economic size           , the income effect in international trade         
        and the geographical distance        . Two dummy variables
30
 are 
used in order to estimate the impact of economic sanctions       and       ; 
the first estimates the impact of comprehensive sanctions while the second 
estimates the impact of selective sanctions. Each country is classified in one of the 
following categories: 
1) Target countries targeted by selective US sanctions (      ), 
2) Target countries subject to comprehensive US sanctions (         and 
3) Countries that are not targeted by US sanctions (            . 
Three different samples are used in order to specify the variable           
constitutes the first sample issued from Sanctions.Net and the U.S. State 
Department’s Embargo Reference Chart. The second sample,     , is the list 
used by Hufbauer et al. (1997). Finally, the third sample,     , includes all 
“controlled countries” determined by the US president as required by the Export 
Administration Act of 1979. These countries have often been referred as former 
planned economies or, in other words, “economies in transition”. The authors 
regressed the model on all three samples. As a result, the basic empirical model 
takes the following form: 
  (       )          (         )      (             )
     (      )                    
(12) 
The logarithmic form of the model allows us to interpret the estimated coefficients 
as elasticities. Elasticities are defined as ratios of the percentage change in the 
dependent variable for each one per cent change in the explanatory variable. The 
time period comprises 19 years of annual data (1980-1998) for US export, imports 
and bilateral trade. The sample size for each year consists of all 225 countries 
whose trade statistics are available in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Lastly, an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression is applied to the model in order 
to estimate the gravity equations. The main advantage of the OLS regression is 
                                                 
30
 A dummy variable indicating whether a country belongs to a trade bloc with the United States 
was initially added but then removed because of multicollinearity problems with the explanatory 
variable distance. 
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that it can be used to estimate the independent effect of each factor, holding 
constant the effect of the other variables. The following table reviews all variables 
used in the model: 
Table 3 Review of Variables used in the Model of Yang et al. (2004). 
Variable Description Coefficient and 
Expected Sign 
        Bilateral trade between country i and j - 
         
31
 Product of GDP of countries i and j    ; positive 
             
32
 Product of GDP per capita between 
countries i and j 
  ; positive 
      33 Distance between countries i and j   ; negative 
     Overall or comprehensive sanctions   ; negative 
     Selective sanctions   ; negative 
For all three dependent variables, the explanatory power of the empirical models, 
determined thanks to the coefficient of determination     indicates a good fit of 
the model. It ranges mostly above 0.80 for the total trade dependent variable, what 
indicates that the explanatory variables used in the model explain more than 80 
per cent of change of the dependent variable. Both results of           and 
       get the expected signs and are highly significant statistically (≥ 99 per cent 
confidence level; except a   90 per cent confidence level for imports’ results for 
the variable        ) throughout the samples. They confirm the former hypotheses. 
It is interesting to notice that US exports distance’s estimates are higher than those 
obtained for bilateral trade, indicating that US exports are more distance-sensitive 
                                                 
31
 Data are gotten from World Development Indicators (World Bank) and are in current US dollars. 
The change from foreign currencies to US dollars is made by using single year official exchange 
rate. We think that the use of the purchasing power standard (PPS) would have been better (spatial 
comparison) in order to isolate price-level differences. 
32
 Data are taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank) and are based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP). As Yang et al. (2004) explain, “trade tends to rise at a faster rate than GDP as 
a country becomes richer, and at a slower rate than GDP if the driving force behind a larger 
economy is simply an increase in population.” Indeed, while per capita income rises, consumers 
purchase a wider variety of goods and services. The demand for differentiated goods increases. 
The intra-industry trade theories explain also the reason why industrialized or rich countries, 
owing similar factor endowments, trade more among themselves. (Yang et al., (2004), p.33). 
33
 Greater distance tends to reduce trade because of transport costs. The distance corresponds to 
the geographical distance between capital cities. Data comes from John A. Byers, Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences at Alnarp. 
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than total US bilateral trade. As regards to the product of GDP per capita, 
             , estimates are positive and significant statistically at the 90 per 
cent confidence interval or better for the dependent variables total trade and 
exports. For the dependent variable imports, estimates are all positive but only 
about half of the cases are statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence 
level or better.  The positive estimates confirm the hypothesis that richer countries 
trade more with the United States than poorer ones. 
3.1.1.1 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on US Bilateral 
Trade 
Let us turn now to the estimates of the two dummy variables,    and   , which are 
supposed to capture the direct effect of US economic sanctions on bilateral trade 
between the United States and the targeted countries. First, with respect to 
selective sanctions (      , the corresponding coefficient,   , are never 
significant statistically using the      and      samples and their signs are not 
coherent either within the series or with the hypothesis that selective sanctions 
depress bilateral trade. As a result, based on these two samples, Yang et al. 
“conclude that selective economic sanctions imposed by the United States have no 
noticeable impact on the bilateral trade flows (…)” (Yang et al., 2004, p.41).  
As the authors noticed, these results indicate that results depend crucially on the 
identification of the target countries, their classification and the datasets being 
used. On the other hand, they also express the minor impact that selective 
sanctions have on total bilateral trade. Nevertheless, this does not imply that these 
types of sanctions have no effect at all. At the opposite, they can produce great 
damages on specific sectors linked with the selective sanctions and that cannot be 
observable in the total bilateral trade impact. 
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Box 3 Method of Calculation required getting Trade’s Reductions in Percentages. 
The following calculation needs to be made to get the diminution in trade flows induced 
by sanctions: take the exponent of the coefficient value for the sanction dummy and 
subtract 1.  
For instance, the coefficient    of year 1995 = -1.3169.  
                 . This 
indicates that comprehensive sanctions were responsible for a reduction of 73.20% of 
bilateral trade volume in 1995. In other words, because of comprehensive sanctions, 
bilateral trade was 73.20% smaller than otherwise. 
Concerning comprehensive sanctions     , its estimates,   , are consistent 
across samples. They are all negative and statistically significant (except for 1987 
and 1992 for the two first samples – estimates that we cannot see in Table 4 
presented above). These estimates indicate a severe impact on bilateral trade. 
Several estimates indicate a reduction of total trade reaching more than 85 per 
cent for instance for the year 1998 in the two first samples’ results:  less than 86 
per cent and less than 86.25 per cent. For the third sample, total trade losses vary 
between 72.18 per cent and 81.30 per cent for years exposed in the Table 4. This 
result is not surprising as the objective of a total trade embargo is to reduce trade 
to zero or in other words to cancel bilateral trade. In the case where results would 
not go in this direction, then there would have an enforcement problem or the 
sanction would be wrongly identified as a total embargo. All the results can be 
found in Table 4, on the next page. 
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Table 4 US Economic Sanctions on US Total Trade.
 34
 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.38. 
                                                 
34
 The authors chose too present these years although they regressed their model on 19 years. 
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3.1.1.2 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on US Exports 
As regards dummy variables, again, the estimates obtained with the samples 
     and      for selective sanctions      are not significant and the signs 
change from year to year. On the contrary, with the sample     , signs are 
coherent (all negative) and estimates become significant at 90 per cent confidence 
level or better since 1987. Estimates range from -0.67 in 1996 to -2.25 in 1989, 
corresponding to an export diminution of 49 per cent for 1996 and 89 per cent for 
1989 from what they should have been without selective US sanctions. Again, the 
choice of the dataset is crucial. In respect to comprehensive sanctions, all 
estimates were at least statistically significant at a 90 per cent confidence level or 
more for the three samples and signs of the estimates were all negative as 
expected. 
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Table 5 US Economic Sanctions on US Exports. 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.44. 
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Yang et al. (2004) illustrates the estimated loss of US Exports to the 20 targets 
included in the      sample in Table 19 and Table 20 in the Appendix. The 
method of estimation is included in Table 20. These estimated losses rely on the 
     sample for which estimates of selective sanctions were statistically 
significant. The total losses vary a lot, going from $4.3 billion in 1987 to $20.5 
billion in 1989. US exports losses have been the largest as Russia and China were 
targeted. For comprehensive sanctions, total export losses range from $1.8 billion 
in 1992 to $5.6 billion in 1997. US exports initially destined to Iran and Cuba saw 
the largest losses. Nevertheless, these estimates should be interpreted with caution. 
First, some countries do not appear in the entire time series due to missing values 
for instance. Therefore, their export losses are distributed among other countries. 
Second, the estimated coefficient variables are averages that involve caution when 
interpreting the country-by-country results. 
Table 6 Estimated Loss of US Exports due to Comprehensive and Selective US 
Economic Sanctions. 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.49. 
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Lastly, Table 6 provides a summary of the US export losses due to both types of 
sanctions. As the table indicates, the average annual loss of US exports since 1987 
is more than $14 billion.
35
 We see that selective sanctions impact is large. This is 
due mainly to US export losses induced by selective sanctions against Russia and 
China.  
3.1.1.3 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on US Imports 
Again, as the two first samples are used, the dummy variable of the selective 
sanctions does not provide consistent signs and statistically significant estimates. 
The situation changes with the third sample, where all estimates are negative and 
statistically significant at a 90 per cent confidence level or better except for 1991. 
For the third sample, estimates vary from -0.69 in 1997 to -2.60 in 1992. They 
demonstrate that US imports from the targeted countries were only 50 per cent 
and less than 8 per cent of what they would have been without any selective 
sanctions’ imposition. Finally, with respect to comprehensive sanctions, the 
estimates for the      variable are all negative and statistically significant at the 
99 per cent confidence level for most years. Concerning sample     , estimates 
indicate reduction of US imports going from 86.36 per cent for the year 1985 
(1980 being statistically not significant we leave it out) to 65.95 per cent in 1998. 
  
                                                 
35
 It is interesting to notice that these results are very similar to the results obtained by Hufbauer et 
al. (1997) despite the differences in the datasets used and the time periods considered in the two 
econometric studies. Indeed, the former predicted that US exports were $15 billion to $19 billion 
lower than they should have been theoretically in 1995. 
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Table 7 US Economic Sanctions Impact on US Imports. 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.51. 
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3.1.1.4 Impact of US Economic Sanctions on European 
Union and Japan 
The authors logically focus on the results of the      sample because of its 
statistically significance for their analysis of the impact of US economic sanctions 
on the European Union (EU) and Japan. Both estimates coefficients for product of 
GDP and geographical distance are statistically significant and have the expected 
signs, respectively positive and negative. Estimates for the     variable are 
larger for Japan than EU, indicating that the economic size of trading partners has 
a relatively greater influence on Japan’s trade than on European trade.  
Regarding the distance variable, Japan and EU differ significantly. For Japan, 
estimates for the three dependent variables that are total bilateral trade, exports 
and imports, are all greater than 1 in absolute terms. This shows that distance has 
a major impact on Japan’s trade. On the other hand, the EU’s estimates range 
from (-0.50) corresponding to a diminution of 39.35 per cent to (-0.70) 
respectively 50.34 per cent, illustrating that European trade is relatively less 
affected by geographical distance with its trade partners.  
The second objective of Yang et al. (2004) study is to see if US economic 
sanctions have implied a shift in trade from the United States to Japan and 
European Union. Yang et al. (2004) results support that trade has shift from the 
United States to the European Union and Japan because of sanctions. Since the 
1980s, estimates of selective sanctions,     , are mainly consistent for both the 
EU and Japan and across all trade measures: total trade, exports and imports. 
Indeed, they are all negative and statistically significant at the 90 per cent 
confidence level or better (with some exceptions). Moreover, the magnitudes of 
the estimates are comparable with those obtained for the United States. For the 
comprehensive sanctions variable,     , signs are not consistent and estimates 
are mostly not statistically significant for both Japan and the European Union. In 
fact, estimated coefficients are significantly positive for some years. This 
indicates that US comprehensive economic sanctions have some positive spillover 
effects on its main competitors. Trade has been diverted to EU and Japan. 
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Table 8 US Economic Sanctions Impact on EU Trade. 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.53. 
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These results illustrate two situations. First, the selective sanctions observed in the 
dataset have been often enforced through multilateral agreements in which the 
European Union and Japan have also participated. Even if, EU and Japan have 
lifted most of these sanctions since the end of the Cold War, bilateral trade 
between EU and Japan with the targeted countries have not met their normal 
levels as suggested by the gravity model. Second, comprehensive sanctions have 
been mostly enforced unilaterally by the United States such as in cases of Cuban 
or Iranian embargoes, allowing for positive spillover effects on main US 
competitors. 
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Table 9 US Economic Sanctions Impact on Japan's Trade. 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.54. 
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3.1.1.5 Conclusions 
To conclude, the effect of US economic sanctions on all three measures of trade 
apprehended is very sensitive to the way that targeted countries are identified and 
selected. This is particularly the case for those countries targeted by selective 
sanctions. Only the third sample gets statistically significant results for this type 
of sanctions. For the two other samples, explanations can be found in the fact that 
targeted countries were subject to specific US export controls (arms control for 
instance). Effects were presumably too weak for having an overall impact on the 
dependent variables considered. However, results from the third sample 
regression indicate that US selective economic sanctions have an important 
impact on US exports, imports and bilateral trade.  
US comprehensive sanctions have a significant negative impact on US bilateral 
trade, exports and imports. Iran and Cuba have both been severely harmed by US 
economic sanctions. Moreover, the persistent negative effect of US economic 
sanctions on the “economies on transition” (     sample) and on target countries 
subject to comprehensive sanctions indicates a strong lingering effect on bilateral 
trade. 
For the third-country effects, different results arose. For most cases, US economic 
sanctions affected bilateral trade between target countries and European Union or 
Japan in a similar manner as bilateral trade between the target countries and the 
United States. Indeed, these cases illustrated cases of multilateral sanctions, where 
Japan and EU were parts of the sender coalition. In the case of comprehensive 
sanctions, US economic sanctions have not significantly affected negatively 
bilateral trade between the target and third-country. On the contrary, some cases 
appear where the opposite effect happened: US economic sanctions have 
promoted bilateral trade between the targeted country and its main competitor. In 
these cases, trade diversion occurred. 
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3.1.2 Effects of UN Sanctions on Target and Neighbor 
Countries 
Slavov (2007) analyses the effects of UN sanctions on target and neighbor 
countries as these types of sanctions have multiplied since the end of Cold War. 
Moreover, they are well-known for their spillover effects, affecting third countries, 
neighbors or major trading partners (Slavov, 2007, pp.1703-1704).  
3.1.2.1 Claims and hypotheses 
Slavov develops three sets of claims (C1 to C3) on how total trade embargoes 
influence the target country’s neighbors: 
(C1) Conforming to the neoclassical model of trade with two goods and three 
countries, sanctions will profit third countries whether, in free trade equilibrium, 
they exported and imported similar types of goods as the target country. 
Consequently, supposing that most target countries have similar trade patterns 
than their neighbors (maybe because of similar resource endowments), sanctions 
will benefit neighbors by relocating the world terms of trade in their favor. A 
criticism of this hypothesis is that most target and neighbor countries are small 
countries that have very little influence on the world terms of trade. Therefore, 
this claim seems unlikely, with the famous exception of sanctions against Iraq and 
their significant impact on world oil prices. 
(C2) Sanctions supposedly hurt neighbor countries by breaking up trading routes, 
by rising transportation and other transaction costs, and by disrupting established 
trading ties with suppliers and/or customers. Therefore, a drop is expected to 
appear in neighbors’ trade with the rest of the world succeeding the 
implementation of a UN trade embargo. Under the assumption of a fixed vector of 
world prices (since most target and neighbor countries are price-takers in world 
markets), increased transportation costs increase the price of imports neighbor 
countries have to pay, and diminish the price they earn for their exports. 
(C3) Sanctions allegedly profit neighbor countries by enabling them to undertake 
sanction-busting activities. As Slavov writes: “Anecdotal evidence on the 
involvement of neighbor countries in smuggling is overwhelming.” (Slavov, 2007, 
p.1705). The problem with smuggling is that it is difficult to observe, if possible, 
  
84 
and quantify. Moreover, official statistics do not measure it directly. The 
smuggling hypothesis assumes that neighboring countries will trade more 
intensely with the rest of the world during the sanction episode, because they trade 
on behalf of the target country (which is officially in situation of autarky), and 
then smuggle goods back and forth across the border. We cannot observe how 
much smuggling is taking place, but we can deduce something about it from the 
extra bilateral trade between the rest of the world and the neighbor country that 
appears during years with UN sanctions. 
As a result, two hypotheses follow from these three claims:  
(H1) The ‘disrupted trade’ (-) hypothesis says that neighbor countries should trade 
less with the rest of the world during UN trade embargoes. 
(H2) The ‘smuggling’ (+) hypothesis assumes that neighbor countries trade more 
with the rest of the world during UN trade embargoes.  
Theoretically, the net impact is ambiguous, depending on which effect takes the 
advantage. 
3.1.2.2 Method and variables 
Slavov uses a modified gravity equation. His data set includes 82 countries in the 
time period 1989-2000. The dataset includes 7 targets of UN sanctions and 33 
neighbor countries to 11 different target countries. Slavov had to exclude 
countries that had no page in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.36 Since 
Slavov disposes of annual data, he considers sanctions being applied for the entire 
year, even if in reality this was not necessarily the case. Slavov proceeds in three 
steps. First, he estimates the following ‘benchmark gravity equation’: 
                                                  
                                             
                       
(13) 
                                                 
36
 Slavov used this source for incomes, exchange rates (especially dollar exchange rates (period 
averages) in order to convert all numbers into constant 1997 US dollars) and populations data. 
Trade data are taken in Statistics Canada’s World Trade Analyzer. Slavov used US Producer Price 
Index (source: US Bureau of Labour Statistics) as well for converting numbers. Then, he used the 
online edition of the CIA’s World Factbook for information related to languages, national capitals 
and contiguity. Lastly, he calculated distances thanks to the website www.indo.com/distance. 
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             corresponds to the natural log of exports from country i to country j 
during year t, in constant 1997 US dollars.      is the constant term and is time-
varying.        and        correspond to the logs of national incomes of countries 
i and j during year t and are measured in constant 1997 US dollars.              
and              denote the natural logs of per capita incomes in year t. 
Coefficient on incomes and per capita incomes should be positive, demonstrating 
that trade rises with the size of the countries and with their level of economic 
development.             is the log of distance between capitals (or major 
economic centers) of countries i and j, in miles.
37
 This explanatory variable is 
expected to have negative coefficients as it proxies for transportation costs. Using 
the natural logs allow us to interpret estimates as elasticities. Lastly, the final two 
variables of the equation,               and             are both dummy 
variables, taking value 1 if the two countries share a common land border or a 
common language. Languages considered are: English, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, 
French, German, Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese. Dummy variables’ expected 
signs should be positive as these two factors influence positively bilateral trade. 
Second, he adds four dummy variables to the previous equation for measuring the 
effect of economic sanctions. ‘Importing country is a target’ and ‘Exporting 
country is a target’ take the value 1 for all trading pairs in which the 
importing/exporting country was a target of UN sanctions, only for years with UN 
sanctions. Coefficients signs are expected to be negative for both dummies since 
they capture the increase in the bilateral trade barrier     between target countries 
( ) and the rest of the world ( ). ‘Importing country is a neighbor’ and ‘Exporting 
country is a neighbor’ are set to 1 for all trading pairs in which the 
importer/exporter is a neighbor country to a target country, only for years with 
sanctions. These dummy variables capture anything special in bilateral trade flows 
between neighbor countries and the rest of the world during years of UN sanctions. 
Due to the two contradictory effects of hypotheses ventured, no assumption can 
be made about coefficients’ signs. Indeed, these dummies capture the net effect on 
                                                 
37
 For instance, Chicago has been selected over New York, Los Angeles or Washington due to its 
central location. 
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trade from the rise in bilateral trade barrier     and from the mis-measurement of 
   caused by smuggling. 
Table 10 Review of Variables used in the First Step Model of Slavov (2007). 
Variable Description 
Coefficient and 
Expected Sign 
             Exports from country i to country j during 
year t, in constant 1997 US dollars. 
- 
       and        National incomes of countries i and j during 
year t; are measured in constant 1997 US 
dollars. 
    and   ; positive 
             and 
             
Per capita incomes in year t    and   ;  positive 
            Distance between capitals (or major economic 
centers) of countries i and j, in miles. 
  ; negative 
               Take the value 1 if countries share a common 
border. 
  ; positive 
             Take the value 1 if countries share a common 
language. 
  ; positive 
‘Importing country 
is a target’ 
Take the value 1 if the importing country was 
a target of UN sanctions. 
Negative 
‘Exporting country 
is a target’ 
Take the value 1 if the exporting country was 
a target UN sanctions. 
Negative 
‘Importing country 
is a neighbor’  
Set to 1 for all trading pairs in which the 
importer is a neighbor country to a target 
country, only for years with UN sanctions. 
No assumption on 
coefficients’ signs. 
‘Exporting country 
is a neighbor’ 
Set to 1 for all trading pairs in which the 
exporter is a neighbor country to a target 
country, only for years with UN sanctions. 
No assumption on 
coefficients’ signs. 
Third, Slavov replaced the dummy variable ‘Importing country is a neighbor’ and 
‘Exporting country is a neighbor’ with 22 dummy variables such as ‘Importing 
country is neighbor to Angola’. As a consequence, these 22 dummy variables 
capture the net effect on trade in each of the 11 episodes of UN sanctions from the 
rise in the bilateral trade barrier     and from the mis-measurement of    caused 
by smuggling. 
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3.1.2.3 Results 
Results of the first step are shown in Table 11. Slavov estimated the equation once 
for total trade and once for trade without oil and oil products.
38
 He dismissed all 
observations where trade was equal to zero since the natural logarithm is 
undefined in those cases. Moreover, he added time-fixed effects (11 dummy 
variables corresponding to the years from 1990 to 2000) due to the pooled nature 
of the data. 
All variables have the expected signs and are very highly statistically significant. 
The two specifications give a reasonably good fit to the data: in the first case, the 
R-squared meets 0.72, while in the second case, it attains 0.66. 
Results of the second step are shown in Table 12. As regards the target dummy, in 
both specifications, coefficients gotten with the OLS estimator are negative, 
relatively large and statistically significant at a 99 per cent confidence level or 
better. Therefore, UN sanctions lower bilateral trade between target countries and 
the rest of the world. 
Coefficients of neighbor dummy variables are negative and statistically significant 
at a 95 per cent confidence level or better. These results show that, on a net basis, 
neighbor countries are ‘innocent bystanders’, being affected by negative spillover 
effects. Indeed, UN sanctions break up trading routes, rise transportations and 
other transaction costs and disrupt established trading ties for this category of 
countries. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that coefficients on the neighbor 
dummies are always smaller in magnitude than coefficient on target dummies. As 
a result, the UN sanctions hurt both the target and neighboring countries, but they 
hurt targets more intensely. 
  
                                                 
38
 Slavov justifies the second specification namely: “Oil trade fits awkwardly with theories of 
intra-industry trade, sometimes used to justify the gravity model. We rarely observe two countries 
buying each other’s oil ‘for love of variety’. Furthermore, above it was noted that oil is one of the 
few commodities in which even otherwise small countries (like Iraq) might be able to influence 
world prices. As a robustness check, it is interesting to see how much of a difference the inclusion 
or exclusion of oil is going to make.” (Slavov, (2007), p.1714). 
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Table 11 Benchmark Gravity Equation's Results. 
 
Source: Slavov (2007), p.1714. 
Slavov also estimated the two specifications with ‘fixed effects’ (‘within’) and 
‘random effects’ (GSL) estimators since the dataset is a panel in which the cross-
section unit is the country pair. The ‘fixed effects’ method assumes that 
differences across cross-section units have specific effects that are captured by 
different intercept terms. These different intercept terms capture a non-observable 
heterogeneity and are assumed to be correlated to the regressors. The ‘random 
effects’ method assumes that each cross-section unit has an intercept which is 
randomly drawn from a common distribution. Intercepts are here assumed not to 
be correlated with the regressors. Coefficients resulting from these two methods 
are all negative and are statistically significant except for the dummy variable, 
‘Importing country is a neighbor’, for the second specification. Moreover, 
coefficients are smaller than those estimated with the OLS estimator. The results 
confirm the ‘disrupted trade’ hypothesis. Lastly, in percentages, results indicate us 
that the diminution of the ‘all exports’ dependent variable varies between 36.87 
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per cent (GLS estimator)
39
 to 43.45 per cent (OLS estimator) for ‘Importing 
country is a target’ and between 34.95 per cent (GLS estimator) and 51.80 per 
cent (OLS estimator) for ‘Exporting country is a target’. When discussing the 
neighbor dummies, the OLS estimator indicates that for all exports, the reduction 
reaches 13.93 per cent for ‘Importing country is a neighbor’ and 42.31 per cent for 
‘Exporting country is a neighbor’. 
Table 12 Impact of UN Sanctions on Trade Flows Involving Targets or Their 
Neighbor Countries and the Rest of the World. 
 
Source: Slavov (2007) p.1716. 
The third step results from a criticism stipulating that the dummy variables 
estimate only the average impact of UN trade embargoes on target and neighbor 
countries. Since UN sanctions differ significantly in their breath and intensity, 
going from total embargoes to partial embargoes on limited specific goods (arms 
or diamonds for instance), the impact of sanctions on neighbor countries might 
vary substantially depending on the characteristics of each sanctions regime. 
Therefore, Slavov replaced the 4 former dummy variables by 22 dummy variables 
(11 sanctions episodes). Table 13 and Table 14 show the results. Coefficients 
signs broadly reinforce the ‘disrupted trade’ hypothesis. By analyzing the 11 
sanctions episodes separately, we can see which of the two hypotheses dominates 
for each UN sanctions regime. As a result, we observe that neighbor countries of 
                                                 
39
 Percentages are obtained namely :                        . 
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Libya, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia both exported and imported less with the 
rest of the world during the sanctions episode. For these three sanctions episodes, 
all 12 coefficient estimates were negative and 11 of them were statistically 
significant at the 90 per cent confidence level or better. On the contrary, neighbor 
countries of South Africa both exported and imported more with the rest of the 
world during years of UN sanctions. All 12 coefficients were positive and 
statistically significant. 
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Table 13 Impact of UN Sanctions on Trade Flows Involving Target or Neighbor 
Countries and the Rest of the World – 22 dummy variables. 
 
Source: Slavov (2007), p.1719. 
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Table 14 Impact of UN Sanctions on Trade Flows Involving Target or Neighbor 
Countries and the Rest of the World – 22 dummy variables (2nd Part). 
 
Source: Slavov (2007), p.1720. 
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3.1.2.4 Conclusions 
To conclude, the general impact of sanctions on bilateral trade was shown to be 
negative. Target neighbor countries’ trade with the rest of the world tends to 
diminish during UN sanctions episodes. As a result, neighbor countries stand as 
‘innocent bystanders’. Net effects indicate that the ‘disrupted trade’ hypothesis 
dominates the ‘smuggling’ one. Indeed, increased transportation and other 
transactions costs as well as trade disruptions seem to play an important role. 
These costs will tempt neighbor countries to cheat or enter in sanction-busting 
activities (smuggling) without any doubt. 
Lastly, this study concentrates on UN sanctions, leaving out unilateral sanctions. 
UN sanctions have to be implemented by all member states and, thus, in theory, 
compliance with them should be universal. Moreover, the author chose to 
concentrate his study on neighbor countries, leaving out major trading partners. 
The reason behind this choice is the wish of objectivity in the definitions. 
3.2 What do Case Studies tell us? The Cases of Cuba 
and Iran 
While Chapter 3.1 presented the results of two econometric studies from Yang et 
al. (2004) and Slavov (2007), this chapter reviews results of two case studies 
based on descriptive statistics. Subchapter 3.2.1 presents the first case study from 
Losman (1974) which is on Cuba. Indeed, the embargo implemented against Cuba 
is a reference concerning economic sanctions. Subchapter 3.2.2 introduces a case 
study from Torbat (2005) on Iran that is a more recent and actual case. Both 
subchapters introduce case studies with a small historical situation. 
3.2.1 Case Study on Cuba: the Reference as regards 
Economic Sanctions 
Cuba historically has been connected both commercially and politically with its 
mainland neighbor, the United States. Cuba was a supplier of goods such as sugar 
and nickel while United States was exporting in a variety of sectors. United States 
was Cuba’s major supplier and market as well as the largest investor in Cuba prior 
to the embargo. However, opponent political ideologies divided them. The 1959 
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overthrowing of the Batista regime by revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro 
precipitated these political divergences. As Cuba was getting closer to the Soviet 
Union, commercially and politically, United States reacted by initiating a series of 
policies acting as a near-total embargo. Unilateral economic sanctions 
implemented by the United States against Cuba are broad-reaching in scope and 
duration, during more than four decades. 
In October 1960, the United States implemented an official embargo on exports to 
Cuba. Medical supplies and food products were officially not included in the 
embargo. The American Export Control Act was binding upon resident as well as 
non-resident Americans and overseas American subsidiaries if they had American 
officers or directors. Everything possible has been undertaken in order to isolate 
Cuba economically. For instance, diplomatic representations and pressures upon 
American allies have been used. Whereas United States supplied approximately 
70 per cent of Cuba’s total imports in 1958 and about 68 per cent in 1959, the 
figure had dropped to less than 4 per cent by 1961. On the exports’ side, more 
than 60 per cent of Cuba’s exports went to the United States in the 1950s. In 1961, 
less than 5 per cent of the total exports went to the American market. Since 1962, 
bilateral trade between Cuba and the United States (restrained to vital medical 
supplies or purchases by international organizations) has been nearly zero. 
Table 15 Geographical Distribution of Cuba’s Foreign Trade from 1949 to 1958. 
 
Source: Losman (1974), p.98. 
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Table 15 shows the geographical distribution of Cuba’s foreign trade for the 
period 1949-1958, prior to the Castro regime. Cuba was clearly consuming 
Western products rather than communist ones. Western Europe was the major 
non-Western Hemisphere trading partner, purchasing 21.4 per cent of Cuba’s 
exports (mainly sugar) while supplying 11.6 per cent of Cuba’s total imports. The 
Soviet Union was importing much more from Cuba (1.5 per cent) than it was 
exporting to Cuba (percentage approximating zero). The United States clearly 
appears to be the leading trading partner: 75.4 per cent of Cuba’s total imports 
were coming from the United States whereas 62.5 per cent of its exports were 
destined to it. As a consequence, once sanctions have been imposed by the United 
States, Cuba had to restructure its trade patterns.
40
 
Table 16 Composition and Value of Cuba's Imports in 1954. 
 
Source: Losman (1974), p.99. 
                                                 
40
 On the other hand, Cuba was just a small part of US trade, less than 5% of US exports and 
imports, prior to the embargo (Askari et al., (2003), p.6). 
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Table 16 illustrates the typical composition and value of Cuba’s imports prior to 
the Castro regime. Consumer goods account for 46.4 per cent of the total imports 
while producer goods account for 53.5 per cent. Foodstuff is the largest category 
of imports with 28.6 per cent. Raw materials’ category appears in second place 
with 26.6 per cent, accounting for roughly half of the producer goods imports. 
According to these typical trade patterns, it is logical to presume that trade 
adjustments implied by the embargo’s imposition would have resulted in an 
important rise in Cuban trade with Western non-sanctioning countries. Indeed, 
Cuba would have import goods from sources relatively close as for instance 
Canada and Western Europe, minimizing transportation costs. Moreover, Cuban 
consumption patterns and technological needs required goods produced by 
Western nations and Japan at that time. For instance, from a technical point of 
view, machinery and tractors supplied by Canada, Britain and Spain were more 
likely to suit Cuban industrial and technological needs. Finally, from the language 
point of view, English and Spanish were two languages mastered by Cuban 
traders on the contrary to Russian and other Eastern European languages. As 
Losman sums up, “in the absence of special circumstances, Cuba’s trade patterns 
would naturally have gravitated toward a major expansion with the non-
boycotting [non-sanctioning] “Western” nations.” (Losman, 1974, p.100). 
Nevertheless, these expected trade patterns’ adjustments never happened. Cuban 
imports from non-sanctioning Western nations rose until 30 per cent of Cuban 
total imports for the year 1961. On average, in the time period 1961-1967, the 
percentage attained is 25 per cent, not much more than before embargo’s 
imposition. On the exports’ side, in the same time period, Cuba exported about 
one-fourth of its total exports to these countries. As regards the Soviet bloc, the 
situation differs significantly. Indeed, the Soviet Union became Cuba’s major 
trade partner. In 1966, Cuba imported 79.8 per cent of its total imports from 
Soviet Union and exported 81.4 per cent of its exported goods’ total to the 
socialist bloc. In 1988, around 85 per cent of Cuban bilateral trade was made with 
the socialist bloc; by 1992, almost 66 per cent (Askari et al., (2003), p.1). 
The reason for this diversion of trade towards the least likely group of nations, 
and not the “second-best” trade partners is found in the inability of Cuba to 
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accumulate hard currency earnings. Effectively, without important hard currency 
reserves, meaningful import increases from non-sanctioning western nations were 
almost excluded. Confronted to rapid declining export revenues, Cuba had to cut 
in its imports expenditures. That is the reason why, at that moment, Cuban 
political and ideological considerations led the government to work with the 
Soviet Union that, in addition, was offering large-scale grants and aid. 
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Table 17 Cuban Foreign Trade over the Period 1959-1967. 
 
Source: Losman (1974), p.102. 
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Table 17 demonstrates that since 1961, Socialist nations became Cuban first 
trading partner. Cuba has beard broad and continuous trade deficits with the 
socialist bloc, financed by a various grants and credit schemes. Because of the 
shift from scanty trade surplus to important deficits, Cuba has been confronted to 
serious balance of payments problem. As supposed, the embargo had several 
negative impacts on Cuba. First, Cuban tourism lost its high-spending American 
tourists, thus enlarging the payments deficit. The diversion of tourism by the 
United States reached a great level, as other Caribbean countries have similar 
natural endowments. Second, transportation costs increased enormously because 
Cuba did not divert its trade to its second-best trading partners located nearer than 
the Soviet Union but also because of supplier’s availability. For instance, Cuba 
was importing rice from the American Gulf states prior to the embargo. However, 
it then had to import rice from China. Besides, Western vessels, which carry 
shipments to or from Cuba, were blacklisted by the United States. Knowing that 
the Caribbean area consists of well-established shipping networks and that most 
shipments go through the Caribbean basin prior to arrival in the United States, the 
largest trading partner in the area (measure taken for taking advantage of 
economies of scale in freight), this blacklisting’s decision played a decisive role. 
Indeed, larger companies declined deals with Cuba by fear of loss of US trade. As 
a result, Western companies too were experiencing higher transportation costs 
essentially due to: 
a) The more frequent utilization of smaller, high-cost operators, 
b) The need to pay a profit premium to induce shippers to risk loss of U.S. 
cargoes, and 
c) Higher average costs resulting from the frequent inability to utilize 
carrying capacity fully. 
Castro quickly reacted by implementing exchange control, restricting luxury 
imports for instance, in order to lighten the balance of payments problems. 
Despite measures taken, the enormous balance of payments deficits led to 
constrain import volumes what had important consequences on Cuban domestic 
consumption and production. 
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The new trade relationship with the Soviet Union implied many problems due to 
lack of complementarity between Cuban imports needs and Soviet Union bloc 
export abilities. Often, imports’ quality was unsuitable because of poor production 
processes or inappropriate production to the Cuban climate, methods of use or 
technological needs. One typical example concerns vehicles. Usually, they were 
designed for cool climate and, therefore, they were overheating as well as rusting 
in the humid Cuban climate. Likewise, the type of wheat sent to Cuba was less 
suitable to Cuban mills, thus, implying less output. Besides, many pieces of Soviet 
farm material were aimed at continental crops, which are planted in rows of other 
spans than Cuban practices. As a consequence, they were thrown away. There 
were also problems related to the changeover of the metric system and the 
language as well as cultural barriers. Moreover, as Losman describes: “there have 
been very serious spare parts shortages, both for bloc-supplied goods and for 
those items produced in the U.S. for which parts can only be obtained via 
smuggling.” (Losman, 1974, p.106). 
As Cuba’s capital stock came almost wholly from the United States prior to the 
embargo, the latter had two main consequences in terms of economic impacts on 
the production side. First, the scarcity of replacement parts disrupted production. 
In disrupting production, components of the latter that are land, labor and capital 
have been either underemployed or unemployed at all. Second, because much 
capital material was made unusable because of shortage of parts or specific 
material inputs, the production frontier moved inward. Indeed, the embargo has 
rendered capital equipment economically useless. In relation to the transportation 
industry, in 1961, one quarter of the Cuban buses were out of order because of 
lack of replacement parts and by 1962, only one half of the Cuban railroad 
passenger carriages were running. Regarding cars, an active black market was 
operating for years in order to get spare parts and accessories. Automobiles’ parts 
have been so valuable that cars were cannibalized. Concerning the sugar industry, 
the deficiency of the transport system and the mill failures loomed large on this 
industry. By 1965, nine sugar mills had been cannibalized and only 115 sugar 
mills were still functioning in April 1972 although there were 161 functioning in 
1959. Moreover, the embargo prevented Cuba to trade with its natural partner, the 
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United States, a large and wealthy market. As a result, Cuban producers could not 
benefit from scale economies that the access to a large market such as the US 
market would have allowed. Consequently, their costs of production increased. 
As regards the consumption side, a main characteristic resulting from the embargo 
was the general decrease in output’s quality. This deterioration was mainly due to 
three factors: (1) the great rates of import substitution induced by the embargo, (2) 
the necessary domestic economizing and (3) the lack of complementarity with 
new supplies. Indeed, Cuba was clearly dependent on the United States and on its 
sugar industry prior to the embargo’s imposition. Losman quoted Lary in his 
study: “Import substitution may therefore soon spread a country’s resources too 
thin over numerous small and inefficient enterprises, and extend to types of 
production ill-suited to its conditions, with the unfortunate result of raising costs 
even in industries in which it should otherwise be able to compete.” (Losman, 
1974, pp.112-113. Quotation from: Hal B. Lary, Imports of Manufactures from 
Less Developed Countries, (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1968), p.10.). This was typically the case in Cuba, where many goods knew a 
sharp deterioration in terms of quality. Besides, the Soviet Union, Cuban’s new 
trading partner, was unable to supply some specific raw material inputs or 
supplied badly suitable substitutes or insufficient quantities. Such types of 
problems appeared for every type of products, going from soaps (shortage, 
fragrances’ problems, etc.) to glass bottles (color often caramel rather than clear) 
or still toothpaste, soft drinks (especially Coca Cola), food and so on. As a result, 
in March 1961, general food rationing was implemented.  
Trade with the Soviet Union bloc implied changes in Cuba’s consumption 
patterns. Indeed, Cuba has traditionally been an important consumer of lard. Once 
the embargo was imposed, changes in the Cuban diet were required. In order to 
overcome shortages, the Cuban domestic production of lard and vegetable oils 
was intensified. On the other hand, Castro campaigned against the consumption of 
lard, explaining that it was bad for health. Cuban people were also heavy eaters of 
rice, which was imported from the United States. With the embargo, Cuba turned 
to China, which was supplying rice in insufficient quantities. After political 
troubles between Cuba and China, the latter decided to reduce its supplies 
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drastically. Consequently, again Castro reacted. He proposed to give up rice from 
the diet and to replace it with more nutritional foods being available from its new 
trade partner, the Soviet Union. 
To conclude, at least three factors have been strongly affected by the embargo. 
First, the capital stock has been strongly deteriorated leading to annual growth 
rates probably lower by 2 points or more. Moreover, growth of output has been 
seriously slowed down by the underemployment or unemployment at all of all 
factors of production. Second, the terms of trade worsened, essentially due to 
economic costs implied by getting supplies from sources that are more distant.  
Third, the quality of new imports as well as their usefulness has been 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, the support of the Soviet Union bloc resulted in an 
enormous amount of foreign indebtedness and a dependence upon its new trade 
partner. On the long run, the embargo’s impact diminished because the proportion 
of infrastructure and capital goods that were American-made fall over the time. 
In conclusion, the embargo induced important economic damages. The Soviet 
Union has absorbed some of these damages by helping Cuba financially and by 
becoming its new major trade partner. Politically, the embargo provoked no 
change apart from a rapid reinforcement of the Cuban relationship with the Soviet 
bloc. Indeed, in the absence of the embargo, it is not sure that these bilateral 
economic relations would have been so important. 
3.2.2 Case study on Iran 
The United States was one of the major trading partners of Iran prior to the 
Iranian revolution (1979). In fact, in 1978, a year before the Iranian revolution, the 
United States was the second largest exporter to Iran. The largest exporter was 
Germany with 19 per cent share of Iranian total imports, United States following 
with 16 per cent share of Iran’s imports. However, after the revolution and more 
particularly after a group of students detained 52 American hostages in the US 
Embassy during 444 days starting from 4 November 1979, relations between Iran 
and United States deteriorated. A breakdown of diplomatic relations between the 
two states resulted from this crisis on 7 April 1980. As a result, the United States 
initiated a succession of economic measures and sanctions against the Iranian 
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state for freeing the American hostages. In 1992, the United States became 
worried about the Iranian development of military means. Indeed, they thought 
that this development could endanger American interests in the Persian Gulf. As a 
consequence, they implemented measures in order to prevent Iran from producing 
conventional arms, ballistic missiles, nuclear bombs as well as chemical and 
biological weapons (Torbat, 2005, pp.408-409). Table 22 that can be found in the 
Appendix and issued from Torbat’s article illustrates the historical timeline of the 
US sanctions on Iran from 1979 up to 2002.  
In implementing sanctions, the United States expected its allies to follow its 
process by boycotting purchase of Iranian oil. None of United States’ allies 
reacted as wished: they did not want to change their commercial relationship with 
Iran. The sanctions policy being ineffective, President Clinton decided in 1995 to 
strengthen the sanctions policy by cutting off all trade and investment ties with 
Iran, including purchase of Iranian oil. As a result, a full embargo against Iran was 
implemented by the United States. Nevertheless, US allies did not join the 
sanctioning process. As Torbat describes, “They had too much at stake for not 
doing business with Iran.” (Torbat, 2005, p.409). Effectively, their bilateral trade 
volume with Iran was considerably higher than US bilateral trade with Iran. For 
instance, in 1994, Germany exported four times more than the US to Iran. In 
regards to Japan, Italy and France, they exported more than the US to Iran: Japan 
and Italy twice as much while France only slightly more than the US. In addition, 
these different countries were not convinced that economic sanctions would 
change the Iranian political behavior. That is the reason why, in 1992, the 
European Union implemented the so-called “critical dialogue” policy. This policy 
consisted of critics on the Islamic regime’s behavior while pursuing diplomatic 
and economic relations. As a result, the United States imposed sanctions in a 
unilateral manner. Therefore, in order to gain cooperation of other states 
worldwide, United States had to take more measures, one of them being the Iran 
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). This act consists of extra-territorial measures that 
allow to United States to punish foreign people who exported petroleum products 
as well as natural gas or related technology to Iran. US economic sanctions 
imposed against Iran broke the relationship United States – Iran but not only. On 
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the other side, they deteriorated the relationship with Europe and Japan. Indeed, 
Europe pursued its business with Iran without being afraid of extra-territorial 
sanctions taken by the United States while Japan agreed to invest in the 
development of Iran’s largest oil field in spite of American opposition. Finally, to 
cap it all, Iran decided to change currency for its oil exchanges, demanding euros 
instead of dollars for its future oil sales. The respective reactions of Europe and 
Japan challenged the supremacy of the United States (Torbat, 2005, pp.410-412). 
Now the economic impact of trade sanctions in the Iranian case will be discussed. 
As Torbat study relies on the period 1978-2000, we are going to review trade 
impacts on this period. We can observe the historical pattern of bilateral trade 
volume between the United States and Iran from 1978 to 2002 here below. It is 
important to notice that this graph illustrates official bilateral trade statistics what 
does not include diverted trade implying third actors and non-observable trade 
resulting from smuggling, underground economy and so on. 
Figure 9 US Trade with Iran. 
 Source: Torbat (2005), p.414. 
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, US exports to Iran diminished radically as a 
consequence of the US export embargo. Moreover, Iran was boycotting US-made 
products on the same period. In 1991, Iran lifted its boycott, implying a rise in 
Iranian imports from the United States. A peak was reached in 1992 with about 
$750 million of US Exports to Iran. In 1995, the comprehensive sanctions were 
implemented, implying zero US export to Iran the following years. As a result, the 
United States’ exporter position went from the top of the list of main exporters to 
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the bottom, Germany being the prime exporter in 1994, with around $1.740 
million of exports corresponding to 13.7 per cent of Iran’s total imports. 
Prior to the imposition of US sanctions, machineries and electronics constituted 
the major category of US exported goods to the Iranian economy. United States 
were if not the best, one of the best quality producers of this type of products at 
that time. As a consequence, Iran was forced to import similar products of lower 
quality and at higher prices from other countries. The second category of imported 
products was foodstuffs. This category was easily substitutable and imported from 
other countries. The remaining categories were mostly made of industrial goods 
comprising oil drilling and oil field equipment. These types of products were 
generally essential goods for the Iranian economy, characterized by being price 
inelastic. US exports to Iran were highly essential goods with little or no 
substitutes. As a result, Iran’s demand for such goods was relatively inelastic in 
the short run. Nevertheless, in the long run, once competitors were able to make 
similar products, these products became progressively elastic. The welfare loss 
estimated by Torbat is based on a sanction multiplier of 0.25.
41
 He estimated that 
the welfare loss total was around 25 per cent of US exports to Iran before the 
comprehensive sanctions’ imposition. As Iran imported $329 million goods from 
the United States in 1994 and zero in 1996, the welfare loss equals $82.25 million 
                  . As Torbat explains, “based on this conjectural estimation, 
Iran suffers $82.25 million loss annually for not being able to import the needed 
goods from the US.” (Torbat, 2005, p.415). This amount represented 1.23 per cent 
of Iran GDP of year 1994 expressed in US dollars.
42
 
As regards to Iranian imports, the United States represented a major importer of 
Iranian oil prior to the revolution. In 1987, the United States notably prohibited 
the import of Iranian oil. However, American companies were still purchasing 
                                                 
41
 Torbat calculated his sanction multiplier as follow: “Since in the long run both demand and 
supply curves gradually become elastic, it is reasonable to assume that both elasticities are in 
absolute terms between   and . Substituting these limits for the elasticities in the formula will 
give a lower and upper limit for the sanctions multiplier, which are the lower limit        and 
the upper limit of             . Using the average of the two limits will give a multiplier 
equal to 0.25. This value is reasonably close to the multipliers that have been empirically found by 
Hufbauer and Schott (1985), which are in the range of 0.10 to 0.50 for this kind of case.” (Torbat, 
(2005), p.415). 
42
 Source for the GDP : http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx  
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around 20 per cent of Iranian oil destined for exports via other states, although 
official figures indicated that no direct Iranian oil exports to the United States 
were taking place. Another main Iranian export was Persian carpets. Because of 
the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, their demand decreases forcing their 
prices lower in the world market. As a result, their production falls, increasing the 
already high rate of unemployment in Iran. In 1996, Iran’s total rug exports 
reached one-third of its pre-sanctions year. 
With respect to oil trade, in 1994, Iran exported 2.6 million barrels per day, 
around $13 billion per year. Of this, 600,000 barrels per day were sold to the 
American companies. This amount represented around $3.5 to 4.0 billion per year 
at that period. With the imposition of comprehensive sanctions in 1995, no more 
Iranian oil was allowed to be imported. Iran suffered temporarily small storage 
costs. Indeed, thanks to the quality of its oil, Iran found relatively quickly new 
purchasers. As a result, the oil embargo was ineffective both in the short and long 
terms. In terms of estimated costs, adding up Torbat’s estimated loss from 
interdiction of US exports to Iran ($82 millions) and imports from Iran ($58 
millions), trade sanctions’ costs reached $140 million per year. 
In conclusion, embargo’s short-term main effect was the disruption of Iran’s oil 
exports. It temporarily diminished Iran’s revenues issued from oil exports, by 
raising tanker chartering costs and crude oil storage costs. Moreover, new 
purchasers had to be found. On the other side, the long-term effects of trade 
sanctions are minimal. Iran has to find new suppliers in order to replace goods 
previously produced by US companies. However, due to its geographical location, 
between Europa and Asia, and its former trade partner (its largest trade partner 
was Germany), this was relatively easy to do. Moreover, it is interesting to notice 
that the Iranian boycott of US products, enforced as a reaction of the first US 
sanctions, reduced Iranian dependence vis-à-vis the United States. Lastly, the 
unilaterally manner of sanctioning (just Israel joined the embargo), was the root of 
the relatively small costs suffered by Iran due to sanctions. This is not surprising 
either, that the United States decided to implement the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis proposed an overview of the economic sanctions’ phenomenon based 
on theoretical and empirical evidences. The first part described the economic 
sanctions’ background by reviewing elements of history, explaining the 
institutional law framework from which economic sanctions stem from and by 
defining essential notions about economic sanctions. It gave the historical and 
institutional environment in which the economic sanctions phenomenon takes 
place. This section pointed out that economic sanctions, aimed at changing an 
objectionable behavior policy, result from the wish of countries not to resort to 
armed force.  
The second part focused on mechanisms surrounding economic sanctions. First, it 
described economic sanctions and more particularly partial and total embargoes’ 
impact on trade. It pointed out that partial and total embargo are welfare reducing. 
They distort prices, provoking rent-seeking behaviors. Moreover, they have 
redistributional implications. Embargoes have a higher impact on the terms of 
trade of small economies. Likewise, multilateral sanctions involve a greater 
deterioration in the target’s terms of trade than unilateral ones. Moreover, the 
extent of the rents and the incentive to enter into sanction-busting activities 
increases with the severity of the sanctions as expressed in their terms-of-trade 
effects. Second, the domestic implementation of sanctions and adoption of 
objectionable behavior have been explained using a public choice approach. 
Results indicated that the level of economic sanctions and deviant policy result 
from the composition of interest groups and their respective political effectiveness 
in both sender and target countries. If interest groups had all the same political 
effectiveness, no economic sanctions would be implemented according to the 
interest groups’ approach. Likewise, only economic sanctions that affect 
differently partisans and opponents of the deviant policy would be able to induce 
policy change. Third, the sanctioning process itself has been described as well as 
different countries interactions related to the imposition and effects of sanctions. 
This time a single-rational actor methodology has been used. Reasons for 
economic sanctions’ initiation could be found in explanations for the use of force. 
Related models concluded that sanctions are implemented only when the outcome 
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is a sustained deadlock between the sender and the target. In case of concessions, 
the game ends at the threat stage. Likewise, the formation of a coalition of sender 
countries could be modeled thanks to games. Studies in this field concluded that 
cooperation among potential sender fails in cases of coordination, collaboration 
and suasion games. Finally, Early (2009) confronted realism and liberalism 
theories in order to explain sanctions-busting trade. His results provided strong 
evidence for the liberalism perspective, supporting that individuals and private 
entities that constitute the main actors in international politics, are driven by 
profitability of trading opportunities. 
The last part of this thesis introduced empirical studies on the impact of economic 
sanctions on trade. It first described results of two econometric studies from Yang 
et al. (2004) and Slavov (2007). The first authors focused their study on the 
impact of US economic sanctions on bilateral trade and on third country trade. 
They found that comprehensive sanctions have a significant negative impact on 
US bilateral trade, exports and imports. Third countries effects were more difficult 
to detect. However, it appeared that, in some cases, US economic sanctions have 
promoted bilateral trade between the target country and its main competitor. 
Slavov described results of UN economic sanctions on bilateral exports and on 
neighbor countries of targeted countries. He got similar results for bilateral trade. 
Besides, he showed that target neighbor countries’ trade tends to be negatively 
affected by sanctions implemented against the target. Second, two case studies on 
Cuban and Iran from Losman (1974) and Torbat (2005) have been presented. 
These two case studies based on descriptive statistics provided support for 
econometric results. 
To conclude this thesis, it is essential to comes back on its objective: describing 
the economic sanctions’ effect on trade. We can definitely conclude that economic 
sanctions have a large negative impact on bilateral trade between the sender 
country or coalition and the target country. Both the sender and the target 
countries are deprived from gains of bilateral trade because of embargoes. 
Empirical results corroborate the theory. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten 
that the theory is simplifying reality and that it rests upon many hypotheses. 
Likewise, empirical results concentrate on specific economic sanctions episodes, 
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which differ from each other and have their own characteristics. As a result, even 
if bilateral trade decreases between the sender country and the target country, each 
target, depending on economic sanctions implemented, its trade openness, its 
economic structure, its political relations and so on, is affected in a different 
manner and a different intensity by economic sanctions. Finally, the globalization 
and the evolving world trade patterns influence indirectly the effects of economic 
sanctions on the target country. Even if economic sanctions constitute an 
impressive and remarkable phenomenon, multilateral sanctions and, more 
particularly, multilateral targeted sanctions, enforced within the international 
organization, will be, no doubt, the best alternative to sanction target countries 
effectively in terms of trade in the future years.  
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Appendix 
Agreements Related to the Non-Proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction 
Nowadays, we frequently hear about the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), especially when the news is relating information about Iran or North 
Korea. Indeed, States have concluded several conventions and treaties in response 
to weapons of mass destruction, which constitute one of the most dangerous 
threats against peace and security worldwide. However, the preoccupation related 
to weapon of mass destruction is not new. The discussion began after World War 
II. As a result, already in the 1970s, States were adopting multilateral treaties for 
this purpose. 
The first adopted treaty linked with weapons of mass destruction was the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) also well-known as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. It is a multilateral treaty that has been signed in 1968 and 
that came into force in 1970. This Treaty is almost universal and its objectives are 
“to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament.”  A 
safeguard system has been instituted under the responsibility of the IAEA. In 
addition, the Treaty provides for the IAEA a key role in domains of technology 
transfer for peaceful purposes. The IAEA is an independent international 
organization linked with the United Nations. A specific agreement regulates the 
relation between the IAEA and the UN. In addition, the IAEA relates annually to 
the UN General Assembly and to the Security Council as regards non-compliance 
by States with their safeguarded obligations and on issues concerned with 
international peace and security. 
The second multilateral agreement adopted was the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, well-known as the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC). This Treaty has been adopted in 1972 and came 
into force in 1975. This Treaty has been created in order to supplement the 
Geneva Protocol (1925) that prohibited the use but not the possession or the 
development of chemical and biological weapons. The BWC “bans the 
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development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins, in types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, projective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans 
weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins 
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”  
Lastly, the third multilateral agreement was the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)). The aim of the CWC 
is “to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting 
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of 
chemical weapons by States Parties.”  The Convention entered into force in 1997. 
The implementation of the Convention is ensured by the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC). 
The Security Council adopted the Resolution 1540 in 2004, which asks all States 
to “refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to 
develop, acquire, manufacture, posses, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical 
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and requires all States to adopt 
and enforce appropriate effective laws to this effect.”  Following this resolution’s 
adoption, the United Nations created a special office concerned with disarmament 
affairs, the so-called United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), 
as well as an institute for disarmament research, named United Nations Institute 
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The motto of UNODA is to 
“…strengthening peace and security through disarmament.”  Concerning UNIDIR, 
its objective is “to assist the international community in developing the practical, 
innovative thinking needed to find solutions to the challenges of today and 
tomorrow.”  
In addition to these treaties and conventions, several export control regimes and 
related arrangements have been instituted. These arrangements help to the 
prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The following 
arrangements provide their expertise for the implementation of the export control 
regimes: the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and 
  
118 
the Zangger Committee (Kazeki, 2005, p.211).  Most of these regimes are 
informal arrangements. First, the Australia Group, established in 1985 following a 
United Nations investigation of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, attempts “to ensure 
that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological 
weapons”  thanks to the harmonization of export controls. It brings together 40 
members along the European Commission. Second, the aim of the MTCR’s 
members is the “non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction.”  In order to achieve its goals, the MTCR 
endeavors to coordinate national export licensing efforts undertaken to prevent the 
propagation of such systems. This regime has been constituted in 1987 because of 
the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and brings together 34 
member countries. Thirdly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was created in 1974 and 
its Guidelines were published in 1978. The purpose of this group is “to contribute 
to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of 
Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.”  The NSG Guidelines 
are enforced by each member State in line with its respective national laws and 
practices. It is important to notice that “decisions on export applications are taken 
at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.”  
46 States are members of the NSG. Fourthly, the Wassenaar Arrangement aims 
“to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting 
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-
use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.”  In 
other words, this Arrangement controls exports of conventional weapons and dual 
use products. It was established in 1996 as a follower of the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and brings together 41 
states. Finally, the last export control regime is the Zangger Committee also 
known as the ‘NPT Exporters Committee’ and constituted in 1971. 38 members 
form this Committee that aims to contribute to the interpretation of Article III, 
paragraph 2 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thus provides 
guidance to all parties to the Treaty. Indeed, Article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT 
provides: “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or 
special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or 
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prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material, to 
any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special 
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.”  
The Zangger Committee’s main mission within the NPT’s framework is to take 
into consideration the changes in terms of security and to adjust export control 
condition and criteria periodically and in line with the needs. 
One could think that these export control regimes go against the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Indeed, the GATT constitutes a 
multilateral agreement regulating international trade and that seeks to reduce 
substantially tariffs and other barriers to trade as well as to eliminate 
discriminatory treatments in international commerce.  Notwithstanding, the GATT 
allows export restrictions for non-economic as well as economic reasons (see 
Table 18 in the Appendix). As a consequence, all export control regimes 
mentioned above and UN Security Council Resolutions are authorized under the 
GATT (Kazeki, 2005, p.211). In the same way, many international and regional 
organizations are concerned with economic sanctions and measures taken in order 
to implement them. For instance, many organizations going from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to the League of Arab States (LAS) or the European Union 
(UE) deal with economic sanctions. 
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Table 18 List of Several Types of Export Restrictions. 
 
 Source: Kazeki (2005), p.211. 
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Table 19 Estimated Losses of US Exports to Targets of Selective Sanctions (Millions 
of US Dollars). 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.47. 
 
  
122 
Table 20 Estimated Losses of US Exports to Targets of Comprehensive Sanctions. 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2004), p.48. 
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Slavov’s reasoning 
Slavov starts its reasoning by presenting the following equation of Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2004): 
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where     denotes exports from country   to country  ;    and    are respective 
country incomes;    is world income;     denotes bilateral trade barrier broadly 
defined;   is the elasticity of substitution among different goods. Finally,    and 
   are the ‘multilateral resistance’ terms for the exporting and the importing 
country, defined as: 
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⁄  is country i’s share in world income. The ratio 
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constitutes a key term in the equation as it expresses the ‘relative trade resistance’ 
that is the bilateral trade barrier relative to the two multilateral resistance terms. 
As regards the impact of UN trade embargoes on trade flows, suppose we 
consider trade between a country subject to UN sanctions (denoted by T) and any 
other country in the rest of the world (denoted by R). Bilateral trade flows 
between the two countries will be given by: 
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Bilateral trade barriers     and     raise, relative to the product of the multilateral 
resistance terms      and      and, as a result, bilateral trade should diminish. 
Now, in respect to bilateral trade between a land neighbor (denoted by N) to a 
target country and any other country in the rest of the world (denoted by R), 
bilateral trade flows will be given by: 
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As Slavov writes, “under smuggling hypothesis, country R is trading with a larger 
economic area than captured by   . As a result, its trade with country N should go 
up. Country R will import more from country N during years with UN sanctions 
(but those extra goods have been produced in country T and have been smuggled 
from T into N). Country R will export more to country N during sanctions (but 
those extra exports will ultimately be smuggled from country N into country T and 
consumed there).” (Slavov, 2007, p.1711). On the contrary, under the ‘disrupted 
trade’ hypothesis, UN sanctions increase the level of the ‘relative trade resistance’ 
to country N. As a result, bilateral trade should depress. Effectively, UN sanctions 
imply that trade barriers between neighbor countries and the rest of the world 
raise because of an increase in transaction costs (as for instance, transportation 
costs and insurance) and because of the disruption in established trading ties 
between suppliers and customers. 
Taking natural logs of the gravity equation (1), we get: 
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Overview of US Unilateral Economic Sanctions against Cuba from 1917 to 2000 
Table 21 Overview of US Unilateral Economic Sanctions against Cuba from 1917 to 2000. 
Date Policy Actions Nature of Sanctions 
1917 Passage of Trading with the Enemy Act. This act 
authorizes the US president to “prohibit, limit, or regulate 
trade with hostile countries in time of war.” 
Financial sanctions. 
1960 Imposition of sanctions under Export Control Act. Export sanctions. Unsubsidized foodstuffs and medical supplies exports were allowed. 
1961 Passage of Foreign Assistance Act. Total trade embargo. 
1962 Passage of Tariff Classification Act. Suspension of reduced and most-favored-nation (MFN) duty rates. 
1963 Imposition of Cuban Assets Control Regulation. Freezing of all private and public Cuban assets in the United States. 
Prohibition of all unlicensed American financial and commercial transactions with Cuban and 
Cuban citizens. 
Prohibition of direct and indirect US exports to and imports from Cuba. 
Publications, telecommunications services, informational materials were exempt of interdiction. 
1973 Establishment of Bilateral Anti-Hijacking Agreement. Negotiations to normalize relations. 
Anti-hijacking agreement. 
1975 Amendment to Cuban Assets Control Regulations. Loosening of the regulation aimed to restrict subsidiaries of US companies operating in third 
countries from conducting business with Cuba. 
Replacement by a specific trade license. 
1977 Lapse of Travel Restrictions/Agreement on Maritime 
Issues/Bilateral Opening of “Interest Sections” 
Lapse of travel restrictions. 
Accord on fishing rights and maritime boundaries. 
1982 Reinstatement of Travel Restrictions. Travel restrictions. 
1992 Passage of the Cuban Democracy Act also known as the 
“Toricelli Act”. 
Codification and expansion of many of the existing US sanctions. 
Implementation of new sanctions. 
1996 Passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
Act, the so-called “Helms-Burton Act”. 
Stark expansion of US sanctions. 
1998 Passage of the Omnibus Appropriations Act. Sanctions on trademarks. 
1998 Implementation of Humanitarian Policies. Relaxing of humanitarian medical and export medical supplies and equipment licenses’ acquisition. 
2000 Passage of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
Enhancement Act. 
Relaxing of unilateral sanctions. It allowed conditional sales of food, medicine and some medical 
equipment. 
Source: Askari, Forrer, Teegen and Yang (2003), pp.2-5.  
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Historical Timeline of the US Sanctions on Iran 
Table 22 Historical Timeline of the US Sanctions on Iran. 
Date Stated Reasons for Sanctions Policy Actions Nature of Sanctions 
4 November, 1979 60 American hostages are taken in the US 
embassy in Tehran by a group of students 
who are followers of Ayatollah Khomeini 
President Carter invokes section 232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
US embargoes oil import from Iran. 
13 November, 1979  US House of Representatives vote. Aid and military assistance to Iran are prohibited. 
14 November, 1979  President Carter invokes International 
Emergency Economic Power Act. 
$12 billion Iranian deposits in the US banks and 
foreign subsidiaries are frozen. 
7 April, 1980   US embargoes exports (except food and medicine) to 
Iran. 
19/20 January, 1981  US signs agreement with Iran in Algiers, 
Algeria. 
US transfers part of the Iranian assets to an escrow 
account in exchange for release of the US hostages. 
19 January, 1982  President Ronald Reagan lifts trade 
sanctions. 
Business contracts and commercial agreements resume 
between the two countries. 
13 January, 1984 Iran is accused of being involved in 
bombing of the US Marine Barracks in 
Lebanon in October 1983. 
Iran is added to the list of countries accused 
of supporting international terrorism. 
US prohibits foreign aid, grants, use of credit or 
financial assistance and restricts transfer of weapons 
and ammunition. 
30 March, 1984  US Department of Commerce imposes anti-
terrorism controls on Iran. 
Export of aircraft and related parts and components are 
prohibited, except with valid licences. 
1985-1986 None Iran-Contra deal Little control over exports to Iran. 
28 February, 1987 Iran is accused of not taking adequate 
actions to control narcotics production, 
trafficking and money laundering. 
President Reagan invokes section 481 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
Financial assistance to Iran by Export-Import banks 
and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is 
prohibited. US representatives in international banks 
are instructed to vote against loans to Iran. 
23 September, 1987 Iran’s attitude against peaceful settlement in 
the Iran-Iraq War and on-going support of 
international terrorism. 
Department of Commerce restricts exports 
to Iran and requires validated licences. 
Export and re-export of self-contained underwater 
breathing apparatus and related equipment to Iran are 
prohibited. 
23 October, 1987   Prohibition expands to include 15 high-tech products. 
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29 October, 1987 Supporting terrorism and unlawful military 
action against US flag vessels. 
President Reagan issues an executive order 
invoking section 505 of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act 
of 1985. 
US imposes ban on import of Iranian goods and 
services, mainly crude oil. Exceptions are petroleum 
products refined from Iranian crude oil. 
1989-1991 Iran obtains substance for manufacturing 
chemical and biological weapons. 
Department of Commerce imposition of 
foreign policy export control. 
Export to Iran of substances which can be used in 
manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons is 
prohibited. 
23 October, 1992 Iran’s effort to access sophisticated 
technology with military application. 
President George Bush signs Congress’s 
National Defence Authorisation Act. 
Export of dual-use items to Iran is prohibited. 
5 May, 1995 Iran’s opposition to Middle East peace, 
terrorism and acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction. 
President Clinton issues an executive order 
invoking sections 202/203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Power 
Act. 
US imposes comprehensive sanctions on all bilateral 
trade and investment in Iran. 
5 August, 1996 Sponsoring terrorism. Extra-territorial sanctions: Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act. 
US penalises any foreign company that invests more 
than $20 million in Iran’s oil sector. 
August 2001 Harbouring terrorism. Following Congress, President G.W. Bush 
extends ILSA for another five years. 
 
January 2002  President George W. Bush labels Iran as ‘an 
axis of evil’. 
 
Source: Torbat (2005), pp.410-411. 
